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#### No terror threat

**Walt 12** Stephen M. Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, "'America the brittle?'" September 10, Foreign Policy, <http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/09/09/inflating_the_terrorist_threat_again>

According to yesterday's New York Times, assorted "senior American officials" are upset that adversaries like al Qaeda, the Taliban, or the Somali pirates are not simply rolling over and dying. Instead, these foes are proving to be "resilient," "adaptable," and "flexible." These same U.S. officials are also worried that the United States isn't demonstrating the same grit, as supposedly revealed by high military suicide rates, increased reports of PTSD, etc. According to Times reporters Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, these developments¶ "raise concerns that the United States is losing ground in the New Darwinism of security threats, in which an agile enemy evolves in new ways to blunt America's vast technological prowess with clever homemade bombs and anti-American propaganda that helps supply a steady stream of fighters."¶ Or as Shanker and Schmitt put it (cue the scary music): "Have we become America the brittle?"¶ This sort of pop sociology is not very illuminating, especially when there's no evidence presented to support the various officials' gloomy pronouncements. In fact, the glass looks more than half-full. Let's start by remembering that the Somali pirates and al Qaeda have been doing pretty badly of late. Piracy in the Gulf of Aden is down sharply, Osama bin Laden is dead, and his movement's popularity is lower than ever. Whatever silly dreams he might have had about restoring the caliphate have proven to be just hollow fantasies. And as John Mueller and Mark Stewart showed in an article I linked to a few weeks ago, the actual record of post-9/11 plots against the United States suggests that these supposedly "agile" and "resilient" conspirators are mostly bumbling incompetents. In fact, Lehman Bros. might be the only major world organization that had a worse decade than al Qaeda did.

**Prolif solves war – empirics prove**

**Denney 13** (graduate at Yonsei University, Editor in Chief of Yonsei Journal of International Studies, citing Kenneth Waltz: American political scientist, faculty at University of California Berkeley and Columbia, prominent neorealist scholar in international relations, founder of structural realism, noted proliferation apologist (Steven, “His “Other” Legacy: Kenneth Waltz’s Defense of Nuclear Proliferation”, 5/21/13; <http://sinonk.com/2013/05/21/his-other-legacy-kenneth-waltzs-defense-of-nuclear-proliferation/>)

Kenneth Waltz, an IR giant, passed away last week. The professor was a mastermind mathematician and a genius logistician. A political scientist at both Berkeley and Columbia University and the founder of structural realism, he will be read by IR students for as long as there is an international system, and probably by historians once there isn’t. However, Waltz was also unabashed in his views and unwavering in the defense of theory, and thus hands down another legacy as well. Waltz’s formal legacy will likely be overshadowed, or at least closely followed, in the public arena by his logical but ultimately dogmatic defense of the spread of nuclear weapons. The set of arguments he laid out throughout the latter half of a prolific academic career provide all the reasons states such as North Korea need to defend the legitimacy of their nuclear weapons programs. They are reasons cited almost daily by KCNA and on the pages of Rodong Sinmun. Waltz belonged to a school of scholars who believe that the immutable forces of history and the structural constraints of the international system can be used to explain state behavior. At the most fundamental level, Waltz based his arguments on the unitary (state) model, whereby the state is made up of many parts but is approached, analyzed, and understood as one entity. As such, he posited the notion that individuals, institutions, and ideas matter little in the long run. What matters most is structure. In the current structure, Waltz asserts, states exist in perpetual anarchy and, as a result, rely on self-help to protect their sovereignty and national security. **In the age of nuclear weapons this imperative necessitates the acquisition of a nuclear deterrent, and this is especially the case for states living with an existential threat from a nuclear rival.** In other words: North Korea. Many instinctively respond that this is bad for peace and stability; however, Waltz argued stubbornly to the contrary. In a monograph entitled “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better,” he used “rational deterrence theory” to contend **that peace and stability would be best served by “the gradual spread of nuclear weapons.”** A slow spread “is better than no spread or rapid spread,” he argued, writing: **Nuclear weapons have been the second force working for peace in the post-war world.** They make the cost of war seem frighteningly high and thus discourage states from starting any wars that might lead to the use of such weapons. **Nuclear weapons have helped maintain peace between the great powers and have not led their few other possessors into military adventures.** Building on this argument in a debate with Scott Sagan in 2007 (moderated by Richard Betts), Waltz declared that the acquisition of nuclear weapons is a fail-safe way for any country to protect its “vital interests,” meaning its sovereignty. If a country has nuclear weapons, it will not be attacked militarily in ways that threaten its manifestly vital interests. **That is 100 percent true, without exception, over a period of more than ﬁfty years.**

**New proliferators will build small arsenals – uniquely stable**

**Seng, 98** [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, p.203-206]

However, this "state of affairs" is not as dangerous as it might seem. The nuclear arsenals of limited nuclear proliferators will be small and, consequently, the command and control organizations that manage chose arsenals will be small as well. The small arsenals of limited nuclear proliferators will mitigate against many of the dangers of the highly delegative, 'non-centralized' launch procedures Third World states are likely to use. This will happen in two main ways. First, only a small number of people need be involved in Third World command and control. The superpowers had tens of thousands of nuclear warheads and thousands of nuclear weapons personnel in a variety of deployments organized around numerous nuclear delivery platforms. A state that has, say, fifty nuclear weapons needs at most fifty launch operators and only a handful of group commanders. This has both quantitative and qualitative repercussions. Quantitatively, the very small number of people 'in the loop' greatly diminishes the statistical probability that accidents or human error will result in inappropriate nuclear launches. All else being equal, the chances of finding some guard asleep at some post increases with the number of guards and posts one has to cover. Qualitatively, small numbers makes it possible to centrally train operators, to screen and choose them with exceeding care, 7 and to keep each of them in direct contact with central authorities in times of crises. With very small control communities, there is no need for intermediary commanders. Important information and instructions can get out quickly and directly. Quality control of launch operators and operations is easier. In some part, at least, Third World states can compensate for their lack of sophisticated use-control technology with a more controlled selection of, and more extensive communication with, human operators. Secondly, and relatedly, Third World proliferators will not need to rely on cumbersome standard operating procedures to manage and launch their nuclear weapons. This is because the number of weapons will be so small, and also because the arsenals will be very simple in composition. Third World stares simply will not have that many weapons to keep track of. Third World states will not have the great variety of delivery platforms that the superpowers had (various ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, long range bombers, fighter bombers, missile submarines, nuclear armed ships, nuclear mortars, etc., etc.), or the great number and variety of basing options, and they will not employ the complicated strategies of international basing that the superpowers used. The small and simple arsenals of Third World proliferators will not require highly complex systems to coordinate nuclear activities. This creates two specific organizational advantages. One, small organizations, even if they do rely to some extent of standard operating procedures, can be flexible in times of crisis. As we have discussed, the essential problem of standard operating procedures in nuclear launch processes is that the full range if possible strategic developments cannot be predicted and specified before the fact, and thus responses to them cannot be standardized fully. An unexpected event can lead to 'mismatched' and inappropriate organizational reactions. In complex and extensive command and control organizations, standard operating procedures coordinate great numbers of people at numerous levels of command structure in a great multiplicity of places. If an unexpected event triggers operating procedures leading to what would be an inappropriate nuclear launch, it would be very difficult for central commanders to “get the word out' to everyone involved. The coordination needed to stop launch activity would be at least as complicated as the coordination needed to initiate it, and, depending on the speed of launch processes, there may be less time to accomplish it. However, the small numbers of people involved in nuclear launches and the simplicity of arsenals will make it far easier for Third World leaders to 'get the word out' and reverse launch procedures if necessary. Again, so few will be the numbers of weapons that all launch operators could be contacted directly by central leaders. The programmed triggers of standard operating procedures can be passed over in favor of unscripted, flexible responses based on a limited number of human-to-human communications and confirmations. Two, the smallness and simplicity of Third World command and control organizations will make it easier for leaders to keep track of everything that is going on at any given moment. One of the great dangers of complex organizational procedures is that once one organizational event is triggered—once an alarm is sounded and a programmed response is made—other branches of the organization are likely to be affected as well. This is what Charles Perrow refers to as interactive complexity, 8 and it has been a mainstay in organizational critiques of nuclear command and control s ystems.9 The more complex the organization is, the more likely these secondary effects are, and the less likely they are to be foreseen, noticed, and well-managed. So, for instance, an American commander that gives the order to scramble nuclear bombers over the U.S. as a defensive measure may find that he has unwittingly given the order to scramble bombers in Europe as well. A recall order to the American bombers may overlook the European theater, and nuclear misuse could result. However, when numbers of nuclear weapons can be measured in the dozens rather than the hundreds or thousands, and when deployment of those weapons does not involve multiple theaters and forward based delivery vehicles of numerous types, tight coupling is unlikely to cause unforeseen and unnoticeable organizational events. Other things being equal, it is just a lot easier to know all of what is going on. In short, while Third World states may nor have the electronic use-control devices that help ensure that peripheral commanders do nor 'get out of control,' they have other advantages that make the challenge of centralized control easier than it was for the superpowers. The small numbers of personnel and organizational simplicity of launch bureaucracies means that even if a few more people have their fingers on the button than in the case of the superpowers, there will be less of a chance that weapons will be launched without a definite, informed and unambiguous decision to press that button.

#### New arsenals aren’t destabilizing – small arsenals, no aggression, and deterrence solves

Forsyth 12 [James Wood Forsyth Jr., PhD, currently serves as professor of national security studies, USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He earned his PhD at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver. He has written on great-power war, intervention, and nuclear issues, “The Common Sense of Small Nuclear Arsenals,” Summer, Strategic Studies Quarterly, http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2012/summer/forsyth.pdf]

Whatever its logical shortcomings, it is important to stress that deterrence worked—it kept the Cold War “cold” and allowed international life to go on without a catastrophic nuclear war. After 70 years, **most analysts agree** on the basic dynamics of deterrence, and the contemporary debate regarding deterrence, when not addressing the problem of nonstate actors, tends to pivot on force structure considerations. 19 Here, the behavior of states with small nuclear arsenals is instructive. As previously mentioned, most states with nuclear arsenals have not acquired large numbers of nuclear weapons. Instead, they appear content with a relatively small arsenal **capable** **of** warding off an attack as well as dissuading others from interfering in their internal and external affairs. But of the two roles nuclear weapons seem to play—deterrence and dissuasion—is one more important than another? For India and Pakistan, nuclear weapons play a decidedly deter­ rent role. But if one were to free Britain of its NATO obligations, who exactly would Britain be deterring today? What about France? Neither of these countries is as hard-pressed in the security arena as India or Pakistan, yet both hold on to nuclear weapons. While nuclear weapons still “hold power at bay,” one must wonder whose power is being held at bay and how. It is important not to overinterpret this. Nuclear weapons serve a purpose. How else can one explain why nine states have them, while others appear to want them? But what purpose do they serve, in general? To answer that question, one must look at what nuclear weapons do for states. Among other things, nuclear weapons socialize leaders **to the dangers of adventurism and**, in effect, halt them from behaving or responding recklessly **to provocation**. 20 Statesmen may not want to be part of an international system that constrains them, but that is the system that results among nuclear powers. Each is socialized to the capabilities of the other, and the relationship that emerges is one tempered by caution **despite** the composition, goals, or **desires** of its leaders. In short, nuclear weapons deter and dissuade.

## PTX

### 2AC Wont Pass

#### It won’t pass and Obamacare is taking away focus and energy

Berman 10-29-13 Russell Berman, The HILL “ObamaCare steals spotlight from push on immigration” [http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/188417-obamacare-steals-spotlight-from-push-on-immigration][MG]

The troubled rollout of the healthcare law has thrown a wrench into President Obama’s push for immigration reform. The White House and reform advocates in both parties have sought to refocus attention back to immigration following the 16-day government shutdown, but the problems plaguing the new federal insurance exchange website have dominated headlines. The White House is getting a boost from a coalition of 600 faith, law enforcement and business leaders that plan to descend Tuesday on Capitol Hill to urge the House to take up immigration legislation before the end of the year. “We’ve got to get Congress and the American public to focus on immigration because we’ve got such a short time to get it on the floor,” said Rep. Jeff Denham (Calif.), who over the weekend became the first Republican to sign on to a comprehensive immigration bill similar to the measure that passed the Senate in June. Denham said he hopes other Republicans will announce their support in the coming days, which could give fresh momentum to the legislative push that is central to Obama’s second-term agenda. Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) has yet to bring an immigration bill to the floor, and there is no indication he would do so in the five legislative weeks that remain on the House schedule in 2013. A bipartisan immigration group in the House collapsed in September when two Republicans left, citing a lack of trust in the Obama administration. “We lost some time because of the shutdown,” said Randy Johnson, senior vice president at the Chamber of Commerce, which is participating in Tuesday’s “fly-in” lobbying visit. “There still is time on the House’s schedule to take up some immigration bills,” he said. Yet the administration’s attention — and message — is clearly divided. The White House has been inundated with questions about the buggy HealthCare.gov, the House has begun investigations, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services has launched a daily press briefing to update the public on efforts to fix the website. The setback is a familiar one for immigration reform advocates, who have seen the issue be upended by three separate crises in recent months: the debate over military intervention in Syria, the government shutdown and now the implementation of the healthcare law. “It is getting overshadowed,” said Julian Zelizer, a political scientist at Princeton University. “It’s taking up time, and it is consuming the president’s attention,” he said of the healthcare rollout. Obama will travel to Massachusetts on Wednesday to deliver a speech on healthcare. Advocates in and outside of Congress are urging the House to act in some way on immigration before the end of the year, even if it is only on piecemeal legislation that would have to be reconciled with the Senate bill. They have long feared that once the calendar turns to 2014, jump-starting immigration reform will be next to impossible as attention shifts to the midterm election campaigns. “There’s a window here to move some bills before they go out, helping to set the stage for completing the process early next year and getting it done next year,” Johnson told reporters. “I don’t think that it’s the end of the world if they can’t get it all done by early February, but sure, once you start getting into April or May, you start running out of time.” Denham said the imperative was to “get something off the House floor so we can get to conference before the end of the year.” Boehner has ruled out taking up the Senate bill or any comprehensive measure. He has said he is “hopeful” the House can act on immigration, but for months, he has resisted taking a heavy hand in directing a path forward for a conference that remains dominated by conservatives.

#### Boehner Wont Introduce a Bill in the House

By Russell Berman - 10/29/13 06:00 AM ET ObamaCare steals spotlight from push on immigration reformhttp://thehill.com/homenews/administration/331063-obamacare-steals-spotlight-from-push-on-immigration#ixzz2jIkSw3ML

Denham said he hopes other Republicans will announce their support in the coming days, which could give fresh momentum to the legislative push that is central to Obama’s second-term agenda.¶ Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) has yet to bring an immigration bill to the floor, and there is no indication he would do so in the five legislative weeks that remain on the House schedule in 2013. A bipartisan immigration group in the House collapsed in September when two Republicans left, citing a lack of trust in the Obama administration.¶ “We lost some time because of the shutdown,” said Randy Johnson, senior vice president at the Chamber of Commerce, which is participating in Tuesday’s “fly-in” lobbying visit.

### 2ac – pc

#### Political capital doesn’t exist, fails because of ideology, and isn’t key – winners win

Michael Hirsch 13, chief correspondent for National Journal. He also contributes to [2012 Decoded](http://decoded.nationaljournal.com/contributors/michael-hirsh). Hirsh previously served as the senior editor and national economics correspondent for Newsweek, based in its Washington bureau. He was also Newsweek’s Washington web editor and authored a weekly column for Newsweek.com, “The World from Washington.” Earlier on, he was Newsweek’s foreign editor, guiding its award-winning coverage of the September 11 attacks and the war on terror. He has done on-the-ground reporting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other places around the world, and served as the Tokyo-based Asia Bureau Chief for Institutional Investor from 1992 to 1994. <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207>

On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do what every president does this time of year. For about 60 minutes, he will lay out a sprawling and ambitious wish list highlighted by gun control and immigration reform, climate change and debt reduction. In response, the pundits will do what they always do this time of year: They will talk about how unrealistic most of the proposals are, discussions often informed by sagacious reckonings of how much “political capital” Obama possesses to push his program through. Most of this talk will have no bearing on what actually happens over the next four years. Consider this: Three months ago, just before the November election, if someone had talked seriously about Obama having enough political capital to oversee passage of both immigration reform and gun-control legislation at the beginning of his second term—even after winning the election by 4 percentage points and 5 million votes (the actual final tally)—this person would have been called crazy and stripped of his pundit’s license. (It doesn’t exist, but it ought to.) In his first term, in a starkly polarized country, the president had been so frustrated by GOP resistance that he finally issued a limited executive order last August permitting immigrants who entered the country illegally as children to work without fear of deportation for at least two years. Obama didn’t dare to even bring up gun control, a Democratic “third rail” that has cost the party elections and that actually might have been even less popular on the right than the president’s health care law. And yet, for reasons that have very little to do with Obama’s personal prestige or popularity—variously put in terms of a “mandate” or “political capital”—chances are fair that both will now happen. What changed? In the case of gun control, of course, it wasn’t the election. It was the horror of the 20 first-graders who were slaughtered in Newtown, Conn., in mid-December. The sickening reality of little girls and boys riddled with bullets from a high-capacity assault weapon seemed to precipitate a sudden tipping point in the national conscience. One thing changed after another. Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association marginalized himself with poorly chosen comments soon after the massacre. The pro-gun lobby, once a phalanx of opposition, began to fissure into reasonables and crazies. Former Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., who was shot in the head two years ago and is still struggling to speak and walk, started a PAC with her husband to appeal to the moderate middle of gun owners. Then she gave riveting and poignant testimony to the Senate, challenging lawmakers: “Be bold.” As a result, momentum has appeared to build around some kind of a plan to curtail sales of the most dangerous weapons and ammunition and the way people are permitted to buy them. It’s impossible to say now whether such a bill will pass and, if it does, whether it will make anything more than cosmetic changes to gun laws. But one thing is clear: The political tectonics have shifted dramatically in very little time. Whole new possibilities exist now that didn’t a few weeks ago. Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all. The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.” The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history. Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger. But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.” In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote. Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that political capital is, at best, an empty concept, and that almost nothing in the academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.”¶ ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ¶ Sometimes, a clever practitioner of power can get more done just because he’s aggressive and knows the hallways of Congress well. Texas A&M’s Edwards is right to say that the outcome of the 1964 election, Lyndon Johnson’s landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, was one of the few that conveyed a mandate. But one of the main reasons for that mandate (in addition to Goldwater’s ineptitude as a candidate) was President Johnson’s masterful use of power leading up to that election, and his ability to get far more done than anyone thought possible, given his limited political capital. In the newest volume in his exhaustive study of LBJ, The Passage of Power, historian Robert Caro recalls Johnson getting cautionary advice after he assumed the presidency from the assassinated John F. Kennedy in late 1963. Don’t focus on a long-stalled civil-rights bill, advisers told him, because it might jeopardize Southern lawmakers’ support for a tax cut and appropriations bills the president needed. “One of the wise, practical people around the table [said that] the presidency has only a certain amount of coinage to expend, and you oughtn’t to expend it on this,” Caro writes. (Coinage, of course, was what political capital was called in those days.) Johnson replied, “Well, what the hell’s the presidency for?” Johnson didn’t worry about coinage, and he got the Civil Rights Act enacted, along with much else: Medicare, a tax cut, antipoverty programs. He appeared to understand not just the ways of Congress but also the way to maximize the momentum he possessed in the lingering mood of national grief and determination by picking the right issues, as Caro records. “Momentum is not a mysterious mistress,” LBJ said. “It is a controllable fact of political life.” Johnson had the skill and wherewithal to realize that, at that moment of history, he could have unlimited coinage if he handled the politics right. He did. (At least until Vietnam, that is.) And then there are the presidents who get the politics, and the issues, wrong. It was the last president before Obama who was just starting a second term, George W. Bush, who really revived the claim of political capital, which he was very fond of wielding. Then Bush promptly demonstrated that he didn’t fully understand the concept either. At his first news conference after his 2004 victory, a confident-sounding Bush declared, “I earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it. That’s my style.” The 43rd president threw all of his political capital at an overriding passion: the partial privatization of Social Security. He mounted a full-bore public-relations campaign that included town-hall meetings across the country. Bush failed utterly, of course. But the problem was not that he didn’t have enough political capital. Yes, he may have overestimated his standing. Bush’s margin over John Kerry was thin—helped along by a bumbling Kerry campaign that was almost the mirror image of Romney’s gaffe-filled failure this time—but that was not the real mistake. The problem was that whatever credibility or stature Bush thought he had earned as a newly reelected president did nothing to make Social Security privatization a better idea in most people’s eyes. Voters didn’t trust the plan, and four years later, at the end of Bush’s term, the stock-market collapse bore out the public’s skepticism. Privatization just didn’t have any momentum behind it, no matter who was pushing it or how much capital Bush spent to sell it. The mistake that Bush made with Social Security, says John Sides, an associate professor of political science at George Washington University and a well-followed political blogger, “was that just because he won an election, he thought he had a green light. But there was no sense of any kind of public urgency on Social Security reform. It’s like he went into the garage where various Republican policy ideas were hanging up and picked one. I don’t think Obama’s going to make that mistake.… Bush decided he wanted to push a rock up a hill. He didn’t understand how steep the hill was. I think Obama has more momentum on his side because of the Republican Party’s concerns about the Latino vote and the shooting at Newtown.” Obama may also get his way on the debt ceiling, not because of his reelection, Sides says, “but because Republicans are beginning to doubt whether taking a hard line on fiscal policy is a good idea,” as the party suffers in the polls.¶ THE REAL LIMITS ON POWER¶ Presidents are limited in what they can do by time and attention span, of course, just as much as they are by electoral balances in the House and Senate. But this, too, has nothing to do with political capital. Another well-worn meme of recent years was that Obama used up too much political capital passing the health care law in his first term. But the real problem was that the plan was unpopular, the economy was bad, and the president didn’t realize that the national mood (yes, again, the national mood) was at a tipping point against big-government intervention, with the tea-party revolt about to burst on the scene. For Americans in 2009 and 2010—haunted by too many rounds of layoffs, appalled by the Wall Street bailout, aghast at the amount of federal spending that never seemed to find its way into their pockets—government-imposed health care coverage was simply an intervention too far. So was the idea of another economic stimulus. Cue the tea party and what ensued: two titanic fights over the debt ceiling. Obama, like Bush, had settled on pushing an issue that was out of sync with the country’s mood. Unlike Bush, Obama did ultimately get his idea passed. But the bigger political problem with health care reform was that it distracted the government’s attention from other issues that people cared about more urgently, such as the need to jump-start the economy and financial reform. Various congressional staffers told me at the time that their bosses didn’t really have the time to understand how the Wall Street lobby was riddling the Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation with loopholes. Health care was sucking all the oxygen out of the room, the aides said. Weighing the imponderables of momentum, the often-mystical calculations about when the historic moment is ripe for an issue, will never be a science. It is mainly intuition, and its best practitioners have a long history in American politics. This is a tale told well in Steven Spielberg’s hit movie Lincoln. Daniel Day-Lewis’s Abraham Lincoln attempts a lot of behind-the-scenes vote-buying to win passage of the 13th Amendment, banning slavery, along with eloquent attempts to move people’s hearts and minds. He appears to be using the political capital of his reelection and the turning of the tide in the Civil War. But it’s clear that a surge of conscience, a sense of the changing times, has as much to do with the final vote as all the backroom horse-trading. “The reason I think the idea of political capital is kind of distorting is that it implies you have chits you can give out to people. It really oversimplifies why you elect politicians, or why they can do what Lincoln did,” says Tommy Bruce, a former political consultant in Washington. Consider, as another example, the storied political career of President Franklin Roosevelt. Because the mood was ripe for dramatic change in the depths of the Great Depression, FDR was able to push an astonishing array of New Deal programs through a largely compliant Congress, assuming what some described as near-dictatorial powers. But in his second term, full of confidence because of a landslide victory in 1936 that brought in unprecedented Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, Roosevelt overreached with his infamous Court-packing proposal. All of a sudden, the political capital that experts thought was limitless disappeared. FDR’s plan to expand the Supreme Court by putting in his judicial allies abruptly created an unanticipated wall of opposition from newly reunited Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats. FDR thus inadvertently handed back to Congress, especially to the Senate, the power and influence he had seized in his first term. Sure, Roosevelt had loads of popularity and momentum in 1937. He seemed to have a bank vault full of political capital. But, once again, a president simply chose to take on the wrong issue at the wrong time; this time, instead of most of the political interests in the country aligning his way, they opposed him. Roosevelt didn’t fully recover until World War II, despite two more election victories. In terms of Obama’s second-term agenda, what all these shifting tides of momentum and political calculation mean is this: Anything goes. Obama has no more elections to win, and he needs to worry only about the support he will have in the House and Senate after 2014. But if he picks issues that the country’s mood will support—such as, perhaps, immigration reform and gun control—there is no reason to think he can’t win far more victories than any of the careful calculators of political capital now believe is possible, including battles over tax reform and deficit reduction. Amid today’s atmosphere of Republican self-doubt, a new, more mature Obama seems to be emerging, one who has his agenda clearly in mind and will ride the mood of the country more adroitly. If he can get some early wins—as he already has, apparently, on the fiscal cliff and the upper-income tax increase—that will create momentum, and one win may well lead to others. “Winning wins.” Obama himself learned some hard lessons over the past four years about the falsity of the political-capital concept. Despite his decisive victory over John McCain in 2008, he fumbled the selling of his $787 billion stimulus plan by portraying himself naively as a “post-partisan” president who somehow had been given the electoral mandate to be all things to all people. So Obama tried to sell his stimulus as a long-term restructuring plan that would “lay the groundwork for long-term economic growth.” The president thus fed GOP suspicions that he was just another big-government liberal. Had he understood better that the country was digging in against yet more government intervention and had sold the stimulus as what it mainly was—a giant shot of adrenalin to an economy with a stopped heart, a pure emergency measure—he might well have escaped the worst of the backlash. But by laying on ambitious programs, and following up quickly with his health care plan, he only sealed his reputation on the right as a closet socialist. After that, Obama’s public posturing provoked automatic opposition from the GOP, no matter what he said. If the president put his personal imprimatur on any plan—from deficit reduction, to health care, to immigration reform—Republicans were virtually guaranteed to come out against it. But this year, when he sought to exploit the chastened GOP’s newfound willingness to compromise on immigration, his approach was different. He seemed to understand that the Republicans needed to reclaim immigration reform as their own issue, and he was willing to let them have some credit. When he mounted his bully pulpit in Nevada, he delivered another new message as well: You Republicans don’t have to listen to what I say anymore. And don’t worry about who’s got the political capital. Just take a hard look at where I’m saying this: in a state you were supposed to have won but lost because of the rising Hispanic vote. Obama was cleverly pointing the GOP toward conclusions that he knows it is already reaching on its own: If you, the Republicans, want to have any kind of a future in a vastly changed electoral map, you have no choice but to move. It’s your choice.

#### Obama can’t influence Congress

Koffler 10/11

Keith Koffler, who covered the White House as a reporter for CongressDaily and Roll Call

Obama’s crisis of credibility

By: Keith Koffler

October 11, 2013

http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=CFCD7934-C4A3-4CCC-8261-9038B7E1D759

President Barack Obama is like a novice flier thrust into the cockpit of a 747. He’s pushing buttons, flipping switches and radioing air traffic control, but nothing’s happening. The plane is just slowly descending on its own, and while it may or may not crash, it at least doesn’t appear to be headed to any particularly useful destination.¶ Obama’s ineffectiveness, always a hallmark of his presidency, has reached a new cruising altitude this year. Not even a year into his second term, he looks like a lame duck and quacks like a lame duck. You guessed it — he’s a lame duck.¶ On the world stage, despite Obama’s exertions, Iran’s centrifuges are still spinning, the Israelis and Palestinians remain far apart, Bashar Assad is still in power, the Taliban are gaining strength and Iraq is gripped by renewed violence.¶ At home, none of Obama’s agenda has passed this year. Republicans aren’t bowing to him in the battle of the budget, and much of the GOP seems uninterested in House Speaker John Boehner’s vision of some new grand bargain with the president.Obama has something worse on his hands than being hated. All presidents get hated. But Obama is being ignored. And that’s because he has no credibility. A president enters office having earned a certain stock of political capital just for getting elected. He then spends it down, moving his agenda forward, until he collects a fresh supply by getting reelected. But political capital is only the intangible substrate that gives a president his might. His presidency must also be nourished by credibility — a sense he can be trusted, relied upon and feared — to make things happen. A president enters office with a measure of credibility. After all, he seemed at least trustworthy enough to get elected. But unlike political capital, credibility must be built in office. Otherwise, it is squandered. Obama has used every credibility-busting method available to eviscerate any sense that he can be counted on. He’s dissimulated, proven his unreliability, ruled arbitrarily and turned the White House into a Chicago-style political boiler room. His credibility has been sapped with his political opponents, a public that thinks him incompetent, our allies, who don’t trust him, and, even worse, our enemies, who don’t fear him.

### 2ac – defense lobby shields

#### Defense lobby shields

Sanyal 09 (Sagar, doctorate in political philosophy from the University of Canterbury, New Zealand <http://www.countercurrents.org/sanyal200709.htm>)

Through which institutions are these interests able to have disproportionate influence on foreign policy? This is a matter of the means by which a special interest group X identified in Part 1 can influence the relevant foreign policy makers in the US government. As with any special interests, these ones are likely to seek to influence policy through lobbying and campaign finance. This influence can target both the executive branch (through political parties) and Congress. A ‘revolving door' between highly placed officers in these companies and highly placed officers in the executive branch of government also raises concerns about conflict of interest improprieties. An additional influence of defence companies on congresspersons is through the threat of removing skilled defence jobs from the congressional district. The degree of influence afforded by such mechanisms is disproportionate to the number of voters benefiting from the decision. The majority of voters may have little to gain from the policy, and may even be against military intervention. However, organised, wealthy and well-connected special interests have greater influence on policy makers through lobbying and campaign contributions than do unorganised, relatively poor and relatively poorly connected voters. Lobbying, campaign contributions, political engineering and front-loading A six year study (1998-2003) of Department of Defense contracts, finds that the ten largest defense contractors all spent heavily on both campaign contributions (a combined $35.7 million) and lobbying ($414.6 million). The return on their investment was a combined $340 billion in contracts over that time (Center for Public Integrity 2004). Other major lobbying industries include the energy industry. Campaign contributions and lobbying are aimed both at congresspersons and at the executive. To influence the executive branch, attention might be lavished on senior members of the relevant political parties, and on the presidential candidates. Former Defense Dept military analyst Franklin Spinney describes the two techniques of front-loading and political engineering used by defense companies. Political engineering involves defense contractors spreading jobs and profits over as many congressional districts as possible. Complex weapons systems often involve sub-systems that are sub-contracted to other firms. Such sub-contracting increases the ability to spread production across congressional districts. This maximises the number of congresspersons who stand to lose jobs and revenue for their district's economy (and potentially stand to lose votes as a consequence) in case the defense contract is cancelled. Such pork barrel politics also allows congresspersons to ingratiate themselves with constituents by ‘winning' defense contracts for their district. Those approving a defense program may have qualms about its cost. Front loading is the idea of attaining this approval by quoting unrealistically low figures in order to get the seed money for the program. Once the program is begun, it is easier to get approval for the actual, higher, costs, since failure to approve the costs would leave nothing to show for the seed investment. The approval is also made easier by political engineering, as many congresspersons stand to lose jobs and revenue in their district. By low-balling the cost, the contract is made easier to approve. By political engineering, the contract is made difficult to terminate. Individuals in the Pentagon or Department of Defense are happy with the setup as they get control over a growing volume of resources and weapons. Individuals in the Congress are happy because this funnels government money (via Department of Defense and via defense contractors) to their districts. The contractors are happy as they ensure greater demand for their products. Spinney 1998 [originally 1990]

### General – CIR Fails

#### Immigration cant solve the flood of applications

Murthy 9 (Law Firm, “What if CIR Passes? Can USCIS Handle the Increased Workload?”, NewsBrief, 10-30, http://www.murthy.com/news/n\_cirwkl.html)

Any type of legalization program will face significant opposition, particularly during an economic downturn. However, given the numbers of individuals possibly eligible, even under a less expansive program, the USCIS must prepare for a potential onslaught of applications if any type of CIR passes and becomes the law. As many MurthyDotCom and MurthyBulletin readers know from personal experience, the USCIS has historically suffered from backlogs and capacity issues. Were such a measure to pass, absent substantial changes, a flood of new applications could pose a significant challenge to the processing capacity of the USCIS. *USCIS Preparing to Expand Rapidly, Should Need Arise* A Reuters blog quoted USCIS spokesman, Bill Wright, as saying, “The agency has been preparing for the advent of any kind of a comprehensive immigration reform, and if that means a surge of applications and operations, we have been working toward that.” USCIS Director, Alejandro Mayorkas, has stated that the goal of the USCIS is to be ready to expand rapidly to handle the increase in applications that would result from CIR. In the past, opponents have used lack of capacity and preparation as an argument against CIR and expansion of eligibility for immigration benefits. *Will CIR Result in Increased or Reduced Backlogs for Others?* Legal immigrants and their employers have concerns about being disadvantaged by any CIR legislation that would provide benefits to undocumented workers. However, true CIR is not limited to these provisions, and would be expected to contain provisions regarding various aspects of legal immigration. CIR certainly will be hotly debated and any proposed legislation will be modified throughout the debate process. As part of the preparations of the USCIS, and in order not to harm those who have already initiated cases under existing law, the USCIS needs to continue to work on backlogs. While significant progress has been made in many areas, and case processing times have been improved greatly, there are still case backlogs that need to be addressed.

#### Private contractors hired to implement the plan causes fraud

West 7 (Bill, Chief of the National Security Section – Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “Immigration “Reform” Will Be National Security Disaster”, 5-17, [http://counterterrorismblog.org/2007/ 05/immigration\_reform\_will\_be\_nat.php](http://counterterrorismblog.org/2007/%2005/immigration_reform_will_be_nat.php))

CIS has indicated it would need to bring in private contractor personnel to help deal with the monumental workload increase from reform legislation. Such contractors will invariably be quickly hired, poorly trained, probably low-bid, barely vetted and far more subject to bribery and corruption than permanent Government employees. Not that bribery and corruption will necessarily be that necessary. In short order, the system will be overwhelmed. Whatever minimal fraud detection and prevention safeguards might be erected won’t last long in the face of hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of applications and petitions to be adjudicated. What that means is the information provided on those applications and petitions, and whatever supporting documents they may have (if any), will essentially be taken at face value. Whatever the applicant alien tells the adjudicator will essentially be taken at face value. There will be little time or process available to verify anything, perhaps beyond running the applicant’s name through a standard battery of computer databases (and, even that may become so time consuming some will slip through the cracks).

#### Won’t net increase immigration

Benson 2 (Lenni B., Professor of Law – New York Law School, “Breaking Bureaucratic Borders: A Necessary Step Toward Immigration Law Reform”, Administrative Law Review, Winter, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 203, Lexis)

Many of the process failures arise from the failure of Congress and the agencies to adequately contend with the internal and external forces that shape the agency culture. n313 Although many of these factors operate in other areas of administrative law, several are particularly strong in immigration law. The failure to plan for and counteract these forces, has directly contributed to the erosion of the essential process values. n313 See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 91 (1989) ("Every organization has a culture, that is, a persistent, patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of and human relationship within an organization."). Wilson goes on to note that many organizations have multiple cultures and the relationship of the agency culture(s) to the agency mission may dramatically impact the effectiveness of the organization. See id. at 91-92. Here I am using culture in a broad manner to encompass both the internal and external forces that shape the organizations. a. Congressional Mandates and Dictated Priorities Congress must bear a large part of the responsibility for the crisis in immigration adjudications. n314 Congress mandated express and implied priorities in the statutes n315 or demanded prioritization of specific programs with  [\*283]  the threat of reduced funding or of imposing new statutory mandates. n316 For example, some statutory limits force an allocation of resources to a particular visa category without adequate consideration of how the allocation might disadvantage or paralyze a separate function. Two of the most obvious examples are the naturalization and H-1B petitions. When Congress pressures INS to reform and expedite its naturalization backlogs, the Service Centers move personnel away from the adjustment of status processing and the processing of the employment-based immigrant petitions. n317 The limitation of the total number of H-1B visas, necessitated that the INS put auditing procedures in place to be sure they did not approve more H-1B visas than the statute allowed. n318 Employers worrying about the cap filed large numbers of petitions in the winter and early spring to avoid being shut out of the category altogether. n319 Moving adjudicators to meet the thirty-day deadline meant other visa petitions had to sit waiting for adjudication. n314 Politics presents a treacherous double-edged sword for the INS' efficient and appropriate facilitation of immigration. The highly political debate persists about how vigorously the INS should control illegal immigration. When the INS engages in activities such as surprise work-site inspection, criticism immediately flows from immigrant groups and its conduct is subject to congressional scrutiny and investigation. Yet, on the other hand, if lawmakers perceive the INS as remiss in their duties, they immediately capitalize on the agency's unpopularity by encouraging resentment against it as congressional elections approach. A similar situation plagues other agencies, such as the IRS. See GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE PROJECT, supra note 12; see also Laurent, supra note 12, 13-18 (outlining Government Performance Project in detail). n315 See INA � 214(c)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. � 1184(c)(2)(C) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (mandating thirty day processing for H-1B and L-1 petitions). n316 See Dep'ts of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2001: Hearing of the Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary Subcomm. of the Senate Appropriations Comm., 106th Cong. 183-213 (2000) (transcribing detailed questioning of how appropriated money to INS will be spent). n317 See supra text accompanying notes 183-85 and 215-16 (discussing current backlog problems). n318 See supra note 58 and accompanying text (noting numerical limitations imposed by statute). n319 Interview with Frances Berger, Attorney at Law, Law Office of Frances Berger, New York, N.Y. (July 8, 2000). Although Congress did not intend the agency to suspend other operations, the management of the agency responded to congressional and community pressure. However, the failure to adjudicate one type of petition means that pressure will mount in other categories or unnecessary work will be created. For example, if the immigrant petition cannot be processed in time, the employee will need a renewal of non-immigrant status. The extension petition could have been eliminated altogether if the INS had been able to process the I-140 in a timely fashion. The failure to adjudicate the adjustment of status applications meant that fewer people became permanent residents and a push to rush through cases created a bulge in the workflow. The sudden increase in workload resulted in delayed processing. Delayed processing means the initial grants of work or travel authorization expire. To obtain extensions of these, the individual must make a formal request and the INS has more work for its adjudication officers. n320 n320 See INS Nonimmigrant Classes, 8 C.F.R. � 214.2 (2000) (detailing general requirements for admission, extension, and maintenance of status). One bulge can build into a tidal wave five years later. In 1986, Congress authorized a legalization program resulting in more than three million people  [\*284]  becoming permanent residents over a five-year period. n321 Because permanent residents cannot apply for naturalization until they have completed five years of resident status, n322 the INS began to experience an upswing in the number of naturalization applications. n323 If the INS allows backlogs to grow, and then, through special initiatives, completes the adjustment of status applications for record numbers of people, the bulge will reappear a few years later in naturalization applications and in relative petitions for the employees' family members who have not yet immigrated to the United States.

#### Multiple examples go neg

Fareed Zakaria 09 (editor of Newsweek International) December 2009 “The Secrets of Stability,” http://www.newsweek.com/id/226425/page/2]

One year ago, the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world, was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of globalization—about the virtues of free markets, trade, and technology—were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s. Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector after sector, country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic n this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression." Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets. Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization. One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all. A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but it does reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' " says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?"This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies. It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit. Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think. The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature.

**Economic decline doesn’t cause war**

**MacDonald and Parent 11**

MacDonald**,** Asst Prof. of PoliSci @ Williams College andParent, Asst Prof. PoliSci @ U of Miami, 2011

Paul and Joseph, “Graceful Decline?”, International Security, 35.4, Project MUSE

In this article, we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments. First, we challenge the retrenchment pessimists' claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. In fact, when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers, peaceful retrenchment is the most common response, even over short time spans. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61-83 percent. When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies or adversaries, draw down their military obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations. Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but [End Page 9] necessity is the mother of invention, and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. Knowing only a state's rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined. Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that great powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes. Faced with diminishing resources, great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics, retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through compromise, rather than conflict. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from being a hazardous policy, retrenchment can be successful. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position.

#### Our ev cites 93 examples

Miller 2K, Prof @ U Ottawa,

(Morris, economist, adjunct professor in the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Administration, consultant on international development issues, former Executive Director and Senior Economist at the World Bank, Winter, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Vol. 25, Iss. 4, “Poverty as a cause of wars?” p. Proquest)

Perhaps one should ask, as some scholars do, whether it is not poverty as such but some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that is the factor that contributes in a significant way to the denouement of war. This calls for addressing the question: do wars spring from a popular reaction to an economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and/or from a heightened awareness of the poor of the wide and growing disparities in wealth and incomes that diminishes their tolerance to poverty? It seems reasonable to believe that a powerful "shock" factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership. The leadership, finding that this sudden adverse economic and social impact destabilizing, would possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. There would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis according to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. After studying 93 episodes of economic crisis in 22 countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since World War II they concluded that Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong …..The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth – bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes….(or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence…In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another.)

## K

### 2ac Framework- Normal

#### The Role of the Ballot is Policy Simulation—Effective decision making and TESTING of their ethic requires you to evaluate their material manifestation—The alternative is voting for an FYI without a mechanism to resolve their link arguments

Hodson 10 Derek, professor of education – Ontario Institute for Studies @ University of Toronto, “Science Education as a Call to Action,” Canadian Journal of Science, Mathematics and Technology Education, Vol. 10, Issue 3, p. 197-206

\*\*note: SSI = socioscientific issues

The final (fourth) level of sophistication in this issues-based approach is concerned with students findings ways of putting their values and convictions into action, helping them to prepare for and engage in responsible action, and assisting them in **developing the skills**, attitudes, and values **that will enable them to** take control of their lives, **cooperate with others to bring about change**, and work toward a more just and sustainable world in which power, wealth, and resources are more equitably shared. Socially and environmentally responsible behavior will not necessarily follow from knowledge of key concepts and possession of the “right attitudes.” As Curtin (1991) reminded us, it is important to distinguish between caring about and caring for. It is almost always much easier to proclaim that one cares about an issue than to do something about it. Put simply, our values are worth nothing until we live them. Rhetoric and espoused values will not bring about social justice and will not save the planet. We must change our actions. A politicized ethic of care (caring for) entails active involvement in a local manifestation of a particular problem or issue, exploration of the complex sociopolitical contexts in which the problem/issue is located, and attempts to resolve conflicts of interest. FROM STSE RHETORIC TO SOCIOPOLITICAL ACTION Writing from the perspective of environmental education, Jensen (2002) categorized the **knowledge** that is **likely to promote sociopolitical action** and encourage pro-environmental behavior into four dimensions: (a) **scientific and technological knowledge** that informs the issue or problem; (b) knowledge about the underlying social, political, and economic issues, conditions, and structures and how they contribute to creating social and environmental problems; (c) knowledge about how to bring about changes in society through direct or indirect action; and (d) knowledge about the likely outcome or direction of possible actions and the **desirability of those outcomes.** Although formulated as a model for environmental education, it is reasonable to suppose that Jensen's arguments are applicable to all forms of SSI-oriented action. Little needs to be said about dimensions 1 and 2 in Jensen's framework beyond the discussion earlier in the article. With regard to dimension 3, students need knowledge of actions that are likely to have positive impact and knowledge of how to engage in them. **It is essential** that they gain robust knowledge of the social, legal, and **political system(s)** that prevail in the communities in which they live and develop a clear understanding of how **decisions** are **made within** local, regional, and **national government** and within industry, commerce, and the military. Without knowledge of where and with whom power of decision making is located and awareness of the **mechanisms by which decisions are reached**, **intervention is not possible.** Thus, the curriculum I propose requires a concurrent program designed to achieve a measure of political literacy, including knowledge of how to engage in collective action with individuals who have different competencies, backgrounds, and attitudes but share a common interest in a particular SSI. Dimension 3 also includes knowledge of likely sympathizers and potential allies and strategies for encouraging cooperative action and group interventions. What Jensen did not mention but would seem to be a part of dimension 3 knowledge is the nature of science-oriented knowledge that would enable students to appraise the statements, reports, and arguments of scientists, politicians, and journalists and to present their own supporting or opposing arguments in a coherent, robust, and convincing way (see Hodson [2009b] for a lengthy discussion of this aspect of science education). Jensen's fourth category includes awareness of how (and why) others have sought to bring about change and entails formulation of a vision of the kind of world in which we (and our families and communities) wish to live. It is important for students to explore and develop their ideas, dreams, and aspirations for themselves, their neighbors and families and for the wider communities at local, regional, national, and global levels—a clear overlap with futures studies/education. An essential step in cultivating the critical scientific and technological literacy on which **sociopolitical action depends** is the application of a social and political critique capable of challenging the notion of technological determinism. We can control technology and its environmental and social impact. More significantly, we can control the controllers and redirect technology in such a way that adverse environmental impact is substantially reduced (if not entirely eliminated) and issues of freedom, equality, and justice are kept in the forefront of discussion during the **establishment of policy**.

#### Debating about policy towards Latin America is valuable – without it change is impossible and their discourse gets coopted

Ried Ijed ’10- Ried Ijed is the Revista interamericana de Educación para la Democracia Interamerican Journal of Education for Democracy, (“Towards a Deliberative and Democratic Model of International Cooperation in Education in Latin America”, Vol 3 No. 2, December 2010)

While the discourse of international organizations has changed over the past decade to emphasize more local participation, there continues to be a disjuncture between “explicit” statements embodying democratic values and ideals, and the actual practices within these organizations (Samoff, 2004). There are potentially several factors (both political and technical) that lead to disjuncture between policy and practice. Among the most commonly cited of political factors is the tendency for international organizations to co-opt discourses about participation in order to gain legitimacy, but without showing any real commitment to a democratic transformation and the devolution of power, authority, and control (see Klees, 2002). Democratization policies in these contexts are merely “symbolic,” in that at a public level the problem is recognized but at the implementation level they are neither supported with adequate resources nor sufficiently specific enough to be operationalized (Stromquist, 2003). Technical factors may include the inherent limitations on representation in democratic processes, or the lack of financial resources, technical know- how, and skills required to implement changes and mechanisms that would allow for more democratic participation.

### 2ac – perm

**Perm solves best and doesn’t link – using criticized language is key to undermining it by recognizing it and making it productive**

Shirley Wilson **Logan 01,** Professor of English at the University of Maryland,, JAC: A Journal of Rhetoric, Culture and Politics, http://www.jaconlinejournal.com/archives/vol21.1/logan-amid.pdf

When Audre Lorde observed that the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house, she was arguing that to work against various forms of oppression, we must not employ the tactics of the oppressors; we must develop new ones. Advancing a theory of emancipatory composition, Bradford Stull suggests in Amid the Fall that **those who wish to write a discourse of emancipation must use the oppressor's linguistic tools** ("America's cultural vocabulary") but that they must use them radically. Stull chooses the term composition over the term literacy to highlight intentionality and process. Composition resonates, as well, with a sense of agency not heard in discourse, the term I find myself using synonymously throughout this review. He borrows the term emancipatory from the literacy theories of Henry Giroux and others but expands its meaning to incorporate an explicit, theorized approach to the teaching of emancipatory composition, one that takes into account a range of subjectivities. Acknowledging that racism is one of many forms of oppression in need of compositional liberation, Stull focuses on the "problem" of race, he says, because it emerged out of American slavery, a foundational American institution. His examples suggest that this "race problem" is experienced primarily by African Americans, who are "unique because no other oppressed group has been enslaved in America," implying that it is not a problem for those who are invisibly raced as white. Thus, to demonstrate this "problem," he includes the oft-cited story of Cornel West trying to catch a taxicab in New York City and another in which a white policeman called him "nigger." The remaining examples concern the reluctance of a midwestern university to hire an African American as chancellor; differences in the topics of conversation between residents of the University of Chicago's Hyde Park community and the residents of Chicago's south side; and racist jokes told in Malcolm X's history class. Granted, these examples are meant to be representative of a larger problem, but I could not help wishing that Stull had provided salient examples of racism's systemic and ongoing damage to ordinary black people rather than focusing on the plights of two middle-class black men, Cornel West and a college chancellor. Or maybe the difficulty is that examples need to be provided in the first place. The author studies the emancipatory compositions of W.E.B. Du Bois, Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X because he believes them to be "among the most important rhetoricians of the twentieth century" and because all three influenced the civil rights, anti-war, and separatist social movements through their contributions to the discourse on these subjects. It would be difficult to argue with these choices, given the "twentieth century" qualifier; still, it is hard to think of emancipatory compositions with respect to race in America without at least a footnote reference to such nineteenth-century intellectuals as Frederick Douglass on abolition and human rights or Ida B. Wells on anti-lynching and suffrage. Stull identifies fourtheo-political tropes in theserhetors' emancipatory compositions: the Fall, the Orient, Africa, and Eden. Alluding on one level to the biblical fall of Adam and Eve, the trope of the Fall also suggests various manifestations of societal evils. To demonstrate the prevalence of this trope in the American context, Stull draws examples from theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, John Milton's Paradise Lost, poet Mary Fell, popular culture, and finally Kenneth Burke. From Burke, he derives three subcategories-"Babel," "division of property," and "violence"upon which to develop his analysis. Exploring the theme of Babel in Malcolm X's autobiography and speeches, Stull points to the writer's struggle to increase his own linguistic storehouse and his recognition that difference resides in world views as well as language. Stull suggests that Malcolm X appropriated Standard American English (SAE) in order to overcome the limitations of Babel and speak to dominant culture. For support, he cites Malcolm X's oft-quoted statement, "You have to be able to speak a man's language in order to make him get the point." Limiting his analysis ofDu Bois to his writings in the Crisis, the organ of the NAACP, Stull finds allusion to Babel in Du Bois' discussion of meanings of the word negro, stating that he "appeals to the American rhetorical heritage." Perhaps Stull might have complicated the assumptions inherent in a phrase that reifies such a heritage. Who can claim this heritage and who established it? Stull does later observe that Du Bois steps outside of this heritage in order to question it, but the solution seems to be to choose another language: French. King, according to Stull, finds a solution to Babel in the Judeo-Christian tradition and in the belief that this tradition contains within it elements of a universal language reaching a broad audience. Stull observes that all three writers cite economic deprivation and violence as further evidence offallen America. Given that most African peoples were brought to America as property, it is not surprising that "division of property " emerges as a trope of emancipatory composition. Stull reiterates some of the economic inequities these writers' works address, adding examples from Spike Lee's movie Do the Right Thing perhaps to convince contemporary readers that such inequities still exist. The second emancipatory trope, the Orient, manifests itself in the ways in which Du Bois, King, and Malcolm X remind their audiences of the parallel and frequently intersecting incidents of oppression of African and Asian peoples; all three writers acknowledge a close kinship of oppression among peoples of color worldwide. Stull defends his use of the term Orient-with its concurrent images of alien other, wise person, and backward people-as being particularly comprehensive. He asserts that Orient can include Egypt as well as Japan and can serve to remind us of how the West reductively composed this vast territory. Having myself been trained out of using the descriptor Oriental, it was disconcerting to find it here. Using a phrase such as "Eastern culture(s)" may have been a more effective way to remind readers of this tendency, especially since, at least in the examples provided, the three writers never use Orient and seem always to refer to specific geographical locations-Japan, China, India (Calcutta and Bombay), and Vietnam-even ifstereotypically. As in his earlier demonstration of a racist America, Stull provides more than enough examples of stereotypical perceptions of the Orient, including examples from the movies The Next Karate Kid and City of Hope, Isabel Allende's novel The Infinite Plan, and E.D. Hirsch's Cultural Literacy. One wonders whether, by offering so much wide-ranging evidence that Eastern culture is misunderstood, the author imagines a fairly naive audience. Stull seems particularly eager to account for his inclusion of Africa as a trope of emancipatory rhetoric: "They [extremists] might wonder why I, who profess parochially American inclinations, who is a conservative, would include this term, would demand that Americans who would be literate know Africa and its web of associations. Africa, after all, necessarily leads to a condemnation of the American republic." Unless the point of emancipatory composition is to make those to whom it appeals feel comfortable, eliciting such a reaction would seem to be all the more reason why Africa should be included. Later in this chapter, Stull makes the strong point that this national vocabulary isa site of contention, in opposition to E.D. Hirsch's assertion that it is rather "an instrument of communication among diverse cultures." This is a point well worth remembering especially at places in the text where such terms as "American culture" are used unproblematically. In order to illustrate that Africa has dual images in America (monstrous/noble and suffering), the author gives the example of a student enrolled in a writing class who, in spite of poor performance, received the admiration of his peers because he was studying to become a Muslim and wore an African icon around his neck ("publicly composing Africa on his own body"). The author sees this dress and behavior as a way of demonizing America and sanctifying Africa. Itmay in fact represent the student's attempt to construct a positive self-image, or, as Stull states, it could merely be an "aestheticized piece ofjewelry"-or a bit of both. At any rate, Stull observes that given the student's gesture, this classroom might have served as a site of discussion of emancipatory composition. Fully elaborated examples from the film Legends of the Fall are offered as evidence of the various ways in which America composes a savage Africa. Stull sees Spike Lee's film School Daze as another example of this opposition, with the fraternity men on one side and the "young radicals" who protest South African apartheid on the other. My sense is that the film ismore complicated in that the frat brothers probably also oppose apartheid and that the young radicals in African clothing also desire financial success. The movie has less to do with Africa than with ways of surviving in America. Stull also notes that in their compositions of Africa, the three writers seem to appropriate the cause of a suffering Africa only as a means of pleading for suffering African America, rather than out of concern for African liberation. He suggests that Malcolm X tries to offset in his later speeches a prior belief in the "myth" that blacks were the first humans from whom all other peoples were derived. In view of the fact that for many, then and now, this is not considered myth, perhaps the author could have qualified this characterization. Even Du Bois, later quoted as claiming Ethiopia the "All-mother of men," would himself seem to subscribe to this belief, one the author characterizes as a "radical vision." Malcolm X's speech "After the Bombing" provides ample evidence of this emancipatory trope. In it, he highlights the ways in which negative images of Africa have affected African Americans, and in another speech he composes an Africa that Americans can model emancipation after. Stull observes that King viewed blacks in America as having greater economic potential and that he concentrated, along with Du Bois, on only portraying Africa's positive images. Du Bois' pan-Africanist writings are invoked to remind the reader that Du Bois' Africa would serve as a center for worldwide negotiations. Stull's chapter on Eden is his most astute. Eden, the last of the carefully ordered tropes, marks desire. All three writers describe Eden as a nonexistent ideal. Stull suggests that the socioeconomic privilege ofDu Bois and King resulted in a more positive perspective from which to envision Eden than did Malcolm X' s disruptive life experiences. Malcolm X's Eden took shape as a separatist black Africa of economic and political empowerment. In the pages of the Crisis, Du Bois draws on his experience of parts of America to compose his Eden-Oberlin, Ohio, Seattle, and the American Northwest-but he ultimately argues for the "Edenic potential" of Africa. King, however, never viewed Africa as an Edenic alternative. In his "I Have a Dream" speech, for example, he envisions an Eden firmly rooted in American principles but growing beyond its walls and out into an unknown paradise resonating with images of the second coming. In short, Stull outlines these three writers' differing responses to an oppressive America and in the process captures some of the essential differences in their worldviews, linking those differences to biography. Stull's final chapter reiterates the point made in the first-that **emancipatory composition must be crafted in the "familiar language of the community only to transform it."** Thus, he positions his argument between the political right of William Bennett and E.D. Hirsch and the political left of Ray Browne, Henry Giroux, Arthur Neal, Barbara Hemstein Smith, and others. According to Stull, the Right would frown upon this discourse because it is a discourse that condemns America as racist and looks to Africa for solutions; the Left would reject the notion of a common set of theo-political tropes as an attempt to standardize a nonexistent common cultural knowledge. Stull counters that we both receive and shape literacy and culture and that even those who reject the notion of cultural literacy allude to common knowledge in their writing. So here at the end, Stull pulls us back into the cultural literacy debate-or maybe we were in the midst of it all the time. The issue here, it seems, is not that we allude to things "out there" in the construct called "culture" but that we recognize those referents, along with their freighted meanings, and know them for the ways in which they have promoted the goals of oppression. If the Fall, the Orient, Africa, and Eden are the theo-political tropes of emancipatory composition, we all helped to make them so. Now, as Audre Lorde understood, this is a tricky rhetorical move: to appropriate the oppressor's tools-which are also our tools-ever mindful of the work they have done in the past, and apply them to the task of emancipation. For Stull, to accomplish this is to "Be conservative. Be extreme. Be radical," all at the same time.

### 2ac – apoc – at: vtl

#### Our risk analysis is good for value to life

Langford 03 (Ian, Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment School of Environmental Sciences University of East Anglia and University College London, AN EXISTENTIAL APPROACH TO RISK PERCEPTION)

In contemporary western societies, asking questions such as “Why do we live?” and “What is the meaning of life?” are often seen as symbols of weakness, depression, self indulgence or an inability to simply get on with life. Yet, as Camus stated, these are the most urgent questions of all, and we are all beings seeking meaning, in whatever form (Heidegger, 1966). Life in technologically- oriented Western societies often provides comfort, excitement and stimulus, but fails to provide meaning (Giddens, 1991). On an individual level, the psychiatrist Carl Jung (1966) noted that approximately one-third of all his patients were suffering not from a specific neurosis, but the senselessness and aimlessness of their lives. Viktor Frankl (1969) found that 20 percent of neuroses in clinical practice are ‘noogenic’, i.e. deriving from a lack of meaning in life. Maddi (1967) defined existential neurosis as the chronic inability to believe in the truth, importance, usefulness or interest value of anything one does or can imagine doing. Hobbs (1962) noted that contemporary neuroses are characterized not so much by repression and conversion (lack of insight) but by lack of a sense of purpose and meaning. Risk can provide meaning. In a world where the direct and immediate threats of disease and dying are low, such as infection and war, but indirect and delayed threats are relatively high, such as cancer and unemployment, focusing on certain aspects of risk can give a purpose in life. Different individuals and social groups define this challenge in different ways, from individualistic striving for success to mass protest movements against environmental degradation.

### 2ac – fear good

#### Trying to prevent extinction is critical to an ethical comportment towards alterity

Bryant 12 (Mar 5, Levi, Philosophy Professor at Collin, “Entropy and Me,” http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/03/05/entropy-and-me/)

If we situate Brassier’s radical nihilism in this context, we can see why it is a sort of enlightenment. The truth of extinction is not the gloomy thought that all is pointless because everything is going to be destroyed anyway. Rather, the thought experiment of radical extinction hopefully accomplishes three aims. Insofar as the truth of every person’s life is death (i.e., there’s no afterlife), we should not direct ourselves to an afterlife, but rather should devote ourselves to this life. How can we live in relation to ourselves, to others, and to the earth in order to best live this brief spark that we possess? How should society be transformed and organized to maximize this existence? Second, the truth of extinction with respect to the existence of the human species has the effect of decentering us. We can imagine a world where we are absent. As a consequence, we are not at the center of existence. We are one being– certainly important to ourselves –among others, and we are a being like the others destined to pass away. This discovery encourages us to both respect other beings, but also to recognize the fragility of ourselves and the world we rely on and therefore attend to the preservation of that world. Finally, the extinction of the universe cures us of messianism. There is no apocalypse, no final revelation of the truth, no final salvation, just this world. As such, we should squarely direct ourselves at this world and the work required to maintain this world, not at a world to come or an afterlife.

### 2ac – action turn

#### Images of catastrophe cause an empathic shift – this is crucial in policy debate

Recuber 11 Timothy Recuber is a doctoral candidate in sociology at the Graduate Center of the City. University of New York. He has taught at Hunter College in Manhattan "CONSUMING CATASTROPHE: AUTHENTICITY AND EMOTION IN MASS-MEDIATED DISASTER" gradworks.umi.com/3477831.pdf \*\*we rejected any gendered or offensive language used in this evidence

Perhaps, then, what distant consumers express when they sit glued to the television watching a disaster replayed over and over, when they buy t-shirts or snow globes, when they mail teddy bears to a memorial, or when they tour a disaster site, is a deep, maybe subconscious, longing for those age-old forms of community and real human(SIC) compassion that emerge in a place when disaster has struck. It is a longing in some ways so alien to the world we currently live in that it requires catastrophe to call it forth, even in our imaginations. Nevertheless, the actions of unadulterated goodwill that become commonplace in harrowing conditions represent the truly authentic form of humanity(SIC) that all of us, to one degree or another, chase after in contemporary consumer culture every day. And while it is certainly a bit foolhardy to seek authentic humanity through disaster-related media and culture, the sheer strength of that desire has been evident in the public’s response to all the disasters, crises and catastrophes to hit the United States in the past decade. The millions of television viewers who cried on September 11, or during Hurricane Katrina and the Virginia Tech shootings, and the thousands upon thousands who volunteered their time, labor, money, and even their blood, as well as the countless others who created art, contributed to memorials, or adorned their cars or bodies with disaster-related paraphernalia— despite the fact that many knew no one who had been personally affected by any of these disasters—all attest to a desire for real human(SIC) community and compassion that is woefully unfulfilled by American life under normal conditions today. In the end, the consumption of disaster doesn’t make us unable or unwilling to engage with disasters on a communal level, or towards progressive political ends—it makes us feel as if we already have, simply by consuming. It is ultimately less a form of political anesthesia than a simulation of politics, a Potemkin village of communal sentiment, that fills our longing for a more just and humane world with disparate acts of cathartic consumption. Still, the positive political potential underlying such consumption—the desire for real forms of connection and community—remains the most redeeming feature of disaster consumerism. Though that desire is frequently warped when various media lenses refract it, diffuse it, or reframe it to fit a political agenda, its overwhelming strength should nonetheless serve notice that people want a different world than the one in which we currently live, with a different way of understanding and responding to disasters. They want a world where risk is not leveraged for profit or political gain, but sensibly planned for with the needs of all socio-economic groups in mind. They want a world where preemptive strategies are used to anticipate the real threats posed by global climate change and global inequality, rather than to invent fears of ethnic others and justify unnecessary wars. They want a world where people can come together not simply as a market, but as a public, to exert real agency over the policies made in the name of their safety and security. And, when disaster does strike, they want a world where the goodwill and compassion shown by their neighbors, by strangers in their communities, and even by distant spectators and consumers, will be matched by their own government. Though this vision of the world is utopian, it is not unreasonable, and if contemporary American culture is ever to give us more than just an illusion of safety, or empathy, or authenticity, then it is this vision that we must advocate on a daily basis, not only when disaster strikes.

### 2AC

#### Mexico can produce drones – open licensing is necessary to overall production

Godoy 5/11/13 – Mexico-based correspondent who covers the environment, human rights and sustainable development, journalist since 1996 and has written for various media outlets in Mexico, Central America and Spain (Emilio, “Mexicans Develop Drones for Peace”, Tierramerica, http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/04/mexicans-develop-drones-for-peace/)

MEXICO CITY, Apr 11 2013 (IPS) - Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), better known as drones, have earned a bad reputation due to their controversial use by the United States in its “war on terrorism”, yet they have almost unlimited potential as tools for scientific research. The word “drone” is most commonly associated with the remotely piloted and heavily armed aircraft that are used by the United States to strike down suspected terrorists, but have also caused a great many civilian deaths in countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. However, more than 40 countries around the world either deploy or manufacture drones, according to reports consulted for an article published by IPS. These unmanned airplanes and helicopters are used for such diverse purposes as drawing maps, exploring the ocean floor, measuring temperature or pollution levels, monitoring weather phenomena, and the surveillance of high-risk areas or archaeological sites. Last month, the U.S. space agency NASA sent drones into the plume of the Turrialba volcano in Costa Rica to study its chemical composition. “The technology is emerging, the first applications have just barely begun. Society itself has learned to accept drones beyond their military uses, because they have seen the different ways they can be used. It’s just a matter of time” until they become more widely developed and used, said young Mexican entrepreneur Jordi Muñoz, co-founder of 3D Robotics, a pioneer in the manufacture of drones in Mexico. His story mirrors the evolution of drones, which he began to build in 2007 with the help of 500 dollars provided by U.S. physicist Chris Anderson. “He gave me the money purely on trust. It was the best 500 dollars I ever invested. I decided to build a drone. I was developing the automatic pilot and I went on Google to look for information when I came across a forum. I went in, registered, and saw that they were posting things about homemade drones,” recalled Muñoz, who is currently finishing a degree in computer engineering at the University of California, Berkeley in the United States. The forum was DIY (“Do It Yourself”) Drones, an online community created by Anderson in 2007 as a space for hobbyists who build their own UAVs to share experiences, electronic codes and component maps. “I started to post videos, write code, and document and publish what I was doing,” Muñoz told Tierramérica\*. His work caught the attention of Anderson, the editor-in-chief of Wired magazine until this past January and now the young Mexican’s partner in 3D Robotics. The company does not sell UAVs for military use. The vehicles are designed in the southwest U.S. city of San Diego and assembled across the border in Tijuana, Mexico. They receive between 100 and 150 orders daily from clients in the United States, Brazil, the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, Israel and Japan. 3D Robotics currently employs 60 people and hopes to expand its staff to 100 by the end of the year. Since its founding in 2009, the company has earned around 10 million dollars through sales and received another five million from three U.S. funds that provide financing for tech firms. “In 2013 we want to professionalise all of our products. There have been huge advances, everything has now been greatly simplified, and we want to make drones easy to use. But we need engineers to write code, for manufacturing,” said Muñoz. Working on the basis of open licensing, a network of engineers around the world work together to improve codes and develop more advanced products.

#### Drones Are Key to Decapitating AQAP – Criticisms That Highlight Blowback Wrongly Link Drone Strikes to Recruitment and Overstate the Negative Consequences – Only Increasing the Effectiveness of Drone Strikes Can Drain AQAPs Legitimacy and Create Space for Alternative Engagement Strategies

By Stacey Emker second year Master’s candidate at the Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations January 14, 2013 Analyzing the US Counterterrorism Strategy in Yemen http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/2013/01/analyzing-the-us-counterterrorism-strategy-in-yemen/

When direct action is taken, drone strikes are conducted in concert with the Yemeni government to avoid civilian casualty. President Hadi publicly endorsed U.S. drone strikes in September 2012, making Yemen a reliable counterterrorism partner. This factor is crucial when assessing the effectiveness of drones in Yemen under former President Saleh compared to President Hadi. While former President Saleh pledged Yemen’s support to the U.S. in the “war on terror,” U.S. officials and Yemeni experts questioned Saleh’s commitment and saw him as an unreliable partner and source of intelligence. John Brennan, President Obama’s chief counterterrorism advisor, has made frequent public visits to Yemen over the past year. When speaking of President Hadi’s counterterrorism efforts, Brennan has stated that “the cooperation has been more consistent, more reliable and with a more committed and determined focus.” With this, the information provided by the Yemeni government under President Hadi has greatly improved the efficacy of the drone campaign, and helped in avoiding catastrophic mistakes.¶ The conventional understanding of drones and collateral damage is not a sufficient or systematic explanation of recruitment within the domestic context of Yemen. Christopher Swifts’ interviews with tribal leaders, Islamic Politicians, Salafist clerics, and other sources all revealed that AQAP recruitment is not motivated solely by U.S. drone strikes, but driven by economic desperation. AQAP insurgents lure young Yemeni men with the promise of a rifle, a car, and a salary of four-hundred dollars a month, which is a fortune when half the population is living on less than two dollars a day. AQAP has employed a soft power approach by fulfilling social needs in order to build networks of mutual dependency.¶ Despite the general antipathy for drone strikes, a majority of the Yemeni’s interviewed expressed that AQAP posed a serious threat to their country and had a pragmatic view of the U.S. drone campaign. As long as drones target legitimate terrorists, Yemenis grudgingly acknowledge their utility. With this, it is important to note Yemen’s religious majority and nationalism. The population of Yemen is almost entirely Muslim, made up of Zaydis and Shaf’is. Zaydis are found mostly in North and Northwest Yemen and belong to a branch of Shi’a Islam. Zaydis form the the Huthi insurgent movement, and AQAP statements in Inspire have connected the movement to threats posed by Shi’a in eastern Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq. Since AQAP has attacked two Huthi processions in 2010 and threatened supporters, Zaydi Yemenis do not represent practical recruitment options for AQAP. On the hand, the majority of Yemenis are Shafi’is making up the South and East. The Shafi’is school follows one of the four Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence and is considered a relatively moderate form of Islam. While Islamic radicalism is prevalent within the country, Shafi’is is culturally very different and is not exactly fertile breeding grounds for extremist ideology. As a result, the Al-Qaeda ideology does not go hand-in-hand with the majority of the Yemeni people.¶ Analysis of AQAP’s history suggests that the group’s resiliency within Yemen is due to a group of local Yemeni leaders who understand the local language, tribal customs, and developed relationships with prominent sheiks. Unlike predecessor jihadist groups in Yemen, AQAP has exercised strategic discipline in creating coherent, but nuanced propaganda. The group assimilates broadly popular grievances into a single narrative proposing international jihad as the only solution. The group exploits common malcontent with the Yemeni government over injustices including corruption, the absence of public services and political reform, and unequal distribution of profits from oil. In addition, AQAP has not explicitly called for the outright dissolution of tribal identity like AQAM in Afghanistan Somalia, Iraq, and Pakistan. Within Yemen, AQAP targets Western interests, Yemeni security officials, and economic sectors such as oil and tourism. The group has specifically avoided Yemeni civilian casualties in bombings and suicide attacks. Also, AQAP has avoided potentially divisive American and European targets, such as the many Western-language students, foreign aid, and medical workers who remained in Yemen until 2010. With this, AQAP leaders recognized the importance of managing perceptions in order to sustain legitimacy and have even denied responsibility for terrorist attacks that did not fit with its narrative. The most direct way to reduce AQAP’s viability in Yemen, while simultaneously limiting its capacity to attack the US, requires the removal of its local leadership through drone strikes who are responsible for the group’s strategic guidance.¶ With this, it important to note that drone strikes represent only one tool in the U.S.’s comprehensive policy towards Yemen. The costs of U.S. drone strikes correspond with three distinct forms of blowback that have helped to strengthen AQAP’s narrative and increased recruitment and sympathy for Al-Qaeda linked militants. However, the costs do not outweigh the utility of drone strikes against AQAP within the domestic context. While the U.S. acted more unilaterally in Yemen under President Saleh, the Obama Administration is now working in concert with the transitional government of President Hadi. With this, the relationship between the U.S. and Yemen has transformed into a working partnership in the fight against AQAP. As a partnership, this counterterrorism policy is beneficial for both Yemeni and international support.¶ While Yemen is facing a number of issues, debilitating AQAP represents the first step in improving the overall security situation. By targeting AQAP’s local leadership, the U.S. can eliminate the individuals who are most responsible for maintaining the group’s coherency and strategic guidance. Furthermore, it can be presumed that the AQAP members next in line will be less skilled and will be more prone to violence in order to consolidate power. The leadership will make more mistakes, such as targeting Yemeni civilians, and undermine the group’s legitimacy within Yemen.

#### AQAP on the rise – attack coming and the commitment is huge

CNN Security 2-16-12 (“Al-Qaeda’s Biggest Threat,” http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/02/16/al-qaedas-biggest-threat/, Mike)

Ibrahim al-Asiri is the sort of terrorist who keeps intelligence officials awake at night. He’s al Qaeda’s chief bomb-maker, and he built explosive devices hidden in printer cartridges that got onto several planes in October 2010. He’s still at large in Yemen. The bomb plots he’s alleged to have masterminded – the 2009 underwear bomb plot and printer bombs dispatched to the United States in 2010 – have very nearly worked. And security experts say al-Asiri and al Qaeda in Yemen may yet penetrate the security screening that is meant to protect aviation. Three international plots In the summer of 2009, two Saudi brothers clasped each other in a last embrace in the desert. The elder brother, Ibrahim al-Asiri, had constructed a bomb like none al Qaeda had produced before: a device designed to be inserted inside the rectum of a suicide bomber containing around 100 grams of PETN, a difficult-to-detect white powdery explosive. The suicide bomber was his younger brother, Abdullah al-Asiri. And their target was Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, the head of Saudi counter-terrorism, whose security services had driven them out of Saudi Arabia two years earlier. Their group - al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) - was determined to show that even well-protected targets outside Yemen were not beyond their reach. In the end, the attack - in August 2009 - failed. Despite gaining entry to bin Nayef’s residence by claiming to be defecting, the device killed only Abdullah al-Asiri and slightly injured the head of Saudi counter-terrorism. But even in failure, his brother and comrades were emboldened. Never had al Qaeda come so close to killing a member of the Saudi royal family. At about the same time, a young Nigerian - Umar Farouk AbdulMutallab - arrived in Yemen. Schooled in the West and from a prominent family, he had become radicalized as a student in London. He was the ideal candidate to carry out AQAP's most ambitious attack yet. According to recently released court documents, al-Asiri was instrumental in developing plans for the Nigerian to bring down a U.S. passenger jet as it approached its destination. According to the documents, al-Asiri worked in tandem with American-Yemeni cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, who persuaded the Nigerian to conduct a martyrdom mission and approved al-Asiri’s plan for getting a bomb past security onto a U.S.-bound airliner. Al-Asiri met with AbdulMutallab several times and personally delivered his ingenious new device: 200 grams of PETN stuffed into the lining of specially tailored underwear. According to the court documents, al-Asiri trained AbdulMutallab, "having the defendant practice the manner in which the bomb would be detonated, that is, by pushing the plunger of a syringe, causing two chemicals to mix, and initiating a fire (which would then detonate the explosive)." AbdulMutallab slipped through airport security to board a Detroit-bound flight on Christmas Day but failed to fully detonate the device as the plane came in for landing. It was a lucky escape. An explosives expert told CNN that one of the likeliest explanations for the failure was the wear and tear on the device during AbdulMutallab's three-week journey through Africa, before flying to the United States. After the failed attack, the FBI found al-Asiri’s fingerprints on the underwear device and matched them to a file kept by the Saudi government, but the bomb-maker continued to elude the grasp of counter-terrorism agencies. The following year, Ibrahim al-Asiri began developing his most ingenious device yet. It involved placing 400 grams of PETN inside a printer cartridge and connecting it to a detonator and timer embedded in the circuitry of a laser printer. The choice of a laser printer was deliberate: PETN is similar in texture to ink-toner powder and would therefore evade detection by single-view X-ray machines at many air cargo departure points. "Whoever designed this is at the clever end of the scale," Sidney Alford, one of the world’s leading explosive experts, told CNN. Al-Awlaki again played a significant role in the plot. He “certainly encouraged, supported, supervised al-Asiri's efforts," a senior U.S. counter-terrorism official told CNN. In late October 2010, two printer bombs designed by al-Asiri were dropped off at FedEx and UPS offices in Sanaa, Yemen. They passed through airport security undetected and were then loaded onto the first leg of their journey toward the United States. Only an intelligence tip to Saudi authorities allowed authorities in Dubai and the UK to eventually intercept the deadly cargo. Al-Asiri had concealed the explosives so well that bomb disposal teams at both locations initially believed the printers were not bombs. It was the most sophisticated al Qaeda device that Western counter-terrorism officials had ever seen, and they said it had the potential to bring down a plane. Al Qaeda later boasted in its online magazine Inspire: "The following phase would be for us to use our connections to mail such packages from countries that are below the radar and to use similar devices on civilian aircrafts in Western countries." A bomb-maker’s journey Though al-Asiri remains a shadowy figure, CNN has pieced together details of his journey to jihad. This account is based in part on a detailed briefing on AQAP that Saudi counter-terrorism officials, including Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, provided late last year to Mustafa Alani, the director of security and defense studies at the Gulf Research Center. Saudi Arabia is generally viewed as having the most extensive intelligence presence in Yemen. Bin Nayef, whose father is crown prince, responded to the assassination attempt against him in 2009 by expanding the Saudi intelligence-gathering operation in Yemen, developing a network of informants, according to Alani. In late October 2010, it was a communication from an informant close to AQAP’s inner circle that tipped Saudi Arabia off to the fact that explosive packages had just been dispatched by the group to the United States, according to Alani. Al-Asiri was born in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on April 18, 1982. His father had served as an officer in the Saudi military, and according to interviews the family later gave the Saudi newspaper Watan, nothing about Ibrahim and his brother Abdullah’s upbringing marked them for jihad. "They were not religious boys at the time. They used to listen to music and had a wide variety of friends; friends not like the ones they had later when they became more religious," his mother told Watan. One of their sisters told the newspaper that the death of their brother Ali in a car accident in 2000 was a turning point in Ibrahim and Abdullah's attitude. "It was after that that they started swapping videotapes and cassettes on the Mujahedeen in Chechnya and Afghanistan, and they became at times distant," the sister said. "Abdullah started to go out a lot with his new friends to camps known as 'preaching camps.’ " Al-Asiri began studying chemistry at King Saud University in Riyadh but dropped out after only two years, according to Alani. Though he would acquire bomb-making expertise later on, those studies would lay a foundation for his future terrorist career. Then came the Iraq war. Like hundreds of other young Saudis, al-Asiri was determined to fight in Iraq against the U.S. occupation. But he never made it there. In 2006, he was arrested by Saudi security forces as he tried to cross the border into Iraq. "He was not considered an important person, so he was released after spending a brief amount of time in prison," Alani told CNN. He was held for nine months. When he was released, al-Asiri, who became known as Abu Salah in militant circles, attempted to create a new militant cell inside Saudi Arabia, linked to al Qaeda, that planned to bomb oil pipelines in the country, according to his later designation as a terrorist by U.S. and U.N. authorities. When police swooped in on their meeting place in northern Riyadh, six of his cell were killed in a shootout, but he and his brother were not there. They were not then viewed by Saudi authorities as key members of the Saudi wing of al Qaeda, according to Alani. In 2007, al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia instructed its operatives to move to Yemen, according to Alani. Al Qaeda’s Yemen operations had been given a new life after several of its leaders had escaped from prison the previous year. Al-Asiri, then on the run, called his father to tell him he was leaving the country but did not reveal where he was heading. Saudi counter-terrorism were eavesdropping on the call. The brothers crossed the border into Yemen. Saudi counter-terrorism officials believe that it was only when he moved to Yemen that al-Asiri developed his bomb-making expertise. Alani says there are indications he was tutored by a Pakistani bomb-maker linked to the group. By the summer of 2009, Ibrahim al-Asiri was one of several Saudis in AQAP’s inner circle. In the weeks leading up to the plot to kill bin Nayef, he and his brother were filmed sitting in a tent with several senior AQAP operatives, including its Yemeni leader, Nasir al-Wuhayshi, a former personal secretary to Osama bin Laden. Some counter-terrorism officials believe that al-Wuhayshi might become the overall head of al Qaeda if Ayman al-Zawahiri is killed. The film was for a propaganda video for the forthcoming attack on bin Nayef. According to Alani, the most influential figure within AQAP has been another Yemeni - Qasim al-Raymi - who Saudi counter-terrorism officials suspect steered the group toward directly attacking the United States. After his brother’s death, al-Asiri was deployed to work with a group separate from the rest of AQAP and tasked with plotting attacks against the United States, according to Alani. U.S. officials believe that al-Awlaki led the unit. An enduring threat A U.S. missile strike in September 2011 killed al-Awlaki. U.S. officials believe his death has temporarily lessened the threat of an attack on the United States. But they also believe that AQAP has emerged as the most dangerous part of the al Qaeda terrorist network. As for al-Asiri, "he is in fact undoubtedly one of, if not the largest threats that we face right now," a senior U.S. counter-terrorism official told CNN. "He's smart, determined and quite secretive about his activities and clearly determined." Saudi counter-terrorism officials believe that political turmoil in Yemen is allowing AQAP to gain strength, according to Alani, because the regime of President Ali Abdullah Saleh has focused its efforts on survival rather than counter-terrorism. Recent months have seen jihadist militants linked to AQAP but operating under the banner Ansar al Shariah periodically take control of towns in southern Yemen. In their public statements, AQAP commanders have claimed to be at the forefront of such efforts - in line with their pledge after the death of bin Laden to follow the guidance of al Qaeda’s new leader, al-Zawahiri, whose strategic maxim for jihadists has long been to create "an Islamic base in the heart of the Arab region." Some eyewitness accounts report a new focus within the group on seizing territory. Abdul Razzaq al-Jamal, a Yemeni journalist who was given unique access to al Qaeda fighters in Abyan province, wrote in the Al Quds al Arabi newspaper last autumn that the group had "used a new strategy recently, which is the strategy of showing themselves and controlling." Counter-terrorism analysts disagree on how significant a role the group has played in the fighting in Yemen. An extensive field study published by West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center in September found that most of AQAP’s fighters - in the low hundreds - were drawn from urban areas, and there was no conclusive evidence that the group had yet won the allegiance of tribes in southern Yemen. By contrast, al-Jamal, the Yemeni journalist, described seeing significantly greater numbers of al Qaeda fighters and witnessing their control of several towns in Abyan province last September. Despite a fluctuating situation on the ground, jihadist militants still control significant territory in southern Yemen, including much of the town of Zinjibar, according to reports. Saudi counter-terrorism officials believe AQAP has taken a back seat in the fighting in Yemen, and has instead taken advantage of the breathing space opened up by jihadist advances to build up its cell structure and a network of safe houses, according to Alani. The group, he says, has learned lessons from Iraq, when seizing territory made al Qaeda an easy target for American airstrikes. "Their objective in Yemen is to secure a safe haven for recruitment, training and for planning attacks," Alani told CNN. He says Saudi counter-terrorism officials believe that AQAP's goal is nothing short of eclipsing al Qaeda "central" in the tribal areas of Pakistan as the dominant node of the terrorist network. "They’ve taken a decision to escalate their global campaign of terrorism," he told CNN. "AQAP believe an attack against the United States is worth a hundred attacks on other places." Intelligence challenges The intelligence tipoff that led to the interception of the explosive printers probably saved lives, but it has also made AQAP even more careful about handling information, making it harder for Saudi counter-terrorism to disrupt future plots, according to Alani. "They tried to find who leaked the information, because the information was so accurate that it must be a human intelligence and not electronic intelligence. Al Qaeda in Yemen became very careful: They hardly use mobile phones, they hardly use any electronic technology." Saudi Arabia’s counter-terrorism agency believes that al-Asiri has passed on his bomb-making expertise to about five members of the group. "They understand that Asiri is going to be killed or captured one day," Alani told CNN. "We're talking about a new generation of very skillful bomb builders and very committed people." U.S. counter-terrorism agencies have reached a similar conclusion. "There are other people who will benefit from his expertise. I think the fear is not just that he'll share his ability within his own circle, but rather more widely, and send it to other al Qaeda-sympathetic individuals or organizations," a senior U.S. counter-terrorism official told CNN.

#### And even an unsuccessful nuclear attack results in retaliation, which leads to extinction

Ayson 10 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions, InformaWorld)

But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide.

## Mexican PTX

### 1nc – no impact

**Studies prove no impact**

Perumal 11, business reporter – Gulf Times, 9/14/’11 (Santhosh, <http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=458158&version=1&template_id=48&parent_id=28>)

Oil price shocks are not always costly for oil-importing countries as a 25% increase in oil prices causes their GDP (gross domestic product) to fall by about half of 1% or less, according to an International Monetary Fund (IMF) working paper. “Across the world, oil **price shock episodes have** generally **not been associated with** a contemporaneous **decline in output** but, rather, with increases in both imports and exports,” the paper said. There is evidence of lagged negative effects on output, particularly for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) economies, but the magnitude has typically been small, said the paper, authored by Tobias N Rasmussen and Agustín Roitman. For a given level of world GDP, the paper found that oil prices have a negative effect on oil-importing countries and also that cross-country differences in the magnitude of the impact depend to a large extent on the relative magnitude of oil imports.  “The effect is still not particularly large, however, with our estimates suggesting that a 25% increase in oil prices will cause a loss of real GDP in oil-importing countries of **less than half of 1%, spread over 2–3 years**,” the authors said. One likely explanation for this relatively modest impact is that part of the greater revenue accruing to oil exporters will be recycled in the form of imports or other international flows, thus contributing to keep up demand in oil-importing economies, the paper said. “The negative impact of oil price shocks on oil-importing countries is partly offset by concurrent increases in exports and other income flows,” it said.

### Won’t Pass- energy

#### Won’t pass and no vote until 2014 – plan doesn’t spillover

**Frederick 10-8** (<http://www.bnamericas.com/news/electricpower/mexico-energy-reform-uncertainty-high-on-political-tension2>)

Uncertainty about the timeline and details of Mexico's energy reform will continue to be high over the coming months as the country's main political parties spar over a new reform proposal, according to the latest briefing from risk analysis firm Maplecroft. "The extent of inter-party tensions suggests that negotiations over tax and energy reform could well extend into 2014, and could even ultimately fail, if the [ruling] PRI, the [right-wing] PAN, and the [left-wing] PRD do not succeed in aligning their interests," the briefing reads. After President Enrique Peña Nieto proposed his vision for [energy](http://subscriber.bnamericas.com/Subscriber/index.jsp?idioma=I&tipoContenido=detalle&pagina=content&idContenido=624566&tipoDocumento=1) and [tax reform](http://subscriber.bnamericas.com/Subscriber/index.jsp?idioma=I&tipoContenido=detalle&pagina=content&idContenido=626699&tipoDocumento=1) in August and September, respectively, the PAN proposed its plan for electoral reform. According to the briefing, the PAN is demanding significant changes to the electoral system in exchange for supporting Peña Nieto's PRI in its energy reform push. Without the PAN votes, Peña Nieto will not be able to reform the constitution and break state monopolies in the oil and gas and power sectors.

### No Solvo-energy

#### They don’t solve – the bill’s been watered down – Oil companies need more

**Graham 10-30** (<http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/30/mexico-reforms-idUSL1N0IJ1T320131030>)

A main plank of an economic reform agenda that President Enrique Pena Nieto hopes will strengthen Latin America's No.2 [economy](http://www.reuters.com/finance/economy?lc=int_mb_1001), the reform seeks to raise tax revenue by nearly 3 percent of GDP by 2018. Opposition lawmakers have sought to knock down or change some parts of the bill and were set for a marathon debate through the night, but ruling party officials were confident the changes would not significantly erode potential revenue. The lower house of Congress watered down Pena Nieto's bill earlier this month, throwing out some planned levies against the backdrop of an economic slowdown. They also raised the top income tax rates to push more of the burden onto the wealthy. Senators signed off on the broad outlines of the bill and must now vote on disputed elements. Any changes they make would then need to be voted on by the lower house. Lawmakers will consider calls to raise a planned levy on junk food from 5 percent to 8 percent. Junk food is defined as products that contain more than 275 calories per 100 grams, which would hit chocolate in the land that gave it its name. An 8 percent tax on junk food would raise about 5.6 billion Mexican pesos ($435 million) a year, lawmakers said, or less than 0.04 percent of GDP. Opposition conservatives fought against much of the bill and have been pushing hard to strip out a measure to raise the value-added tax (VAT) rate for states on the U.S. border to 16 percent from the reduced rate of 11 percent they currently enjoy. The changes made to the tax bill by the lower house in mid-October created a shortfall in the budget plan for next year. That prompted lawmakers to raise the government's oil revenue estimate and make other changes to close the funding gap. These are due to be voted by the Senate on Wednesday. CORNERSTONE The tax bill is tied to the 2014 budget, which must be approved by mid-November. It is one of the cornerstones of a reform drive spanning energy to telecommunications that Pena Nieto hopes will boost growth that has lagged fellow emerging [markets](http://www.reuters.com/finance/markets?lc=int_mb_1001) and averaged around 2 percent a year for a decade. The last major reform pending in Congress is the president's planned overhaul of the state-controlled energy sector, which the government hopes will attract investment, help stem a slide in oil output, and power economic growth. Pena Nieto proposed an energy revamp in August that would loosen the grip on the sector of state oil monopoly Pemex and offer private companies profit-sharing contracts. If approved as presented, this would mark the largest opening of the energy sector to the private sector in decades. However, the reform has stopped short of offering production-sharing contracts or concessions that oil majors had been hoping for, and many viewed it as cautious. Some lawmakers believe the energy plan could still be amended to attract more investment.

### Nieto no PC

#### Nieto doesn’t have political capital and scandals thump it

Ackerman 2013

John M., professor at the Institute for Legal Research of the National Autonomous University of Mexico and a visiting scholar at American University, “The Mexico Bubble,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/01/the\_mexico\_bubble\_enrique\_pena\_nieto?wpisrc=obnetwork

According to the hype, Peña Nieto has already transformed the political landscape in Mexico after only four months in office. Time magazine has named him one of its "100 Most Influential People in the World," claiming that he "combines Reagan's charisma with Obama's intellect and Clinton's political skills." The Financial Times raves that with the death of Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, Peña Nieto may now take up the torch of Latin American leadership and revive the "Washington Consensus" that predominated in the region during the 1980s and called for drastic restrictions in social spending and the implementation of "trickle-down" neoliberal economic policies. The Washington Post editorial board suggests that "Washington should be cheering Mexico's gridlock busting -- and taking it as an example." Meanwhile, Thomas Friedman, of the New York Times, has called Mexico the "Comeback Kid" and Shannon O´Neil argues in Foreign Affairs that Mexico has now "made it." Such exaggerations have no basis in reality. Even after months of an expensive, high-profile media blitz, Peña Nieto has begun his administration with the lowest public approval rating of any Mexican president over the last two decades. Only 50 percent of Mexicans approve of his presidency today, much less than the 70 percent who supported the first non-PRI president, Vicente Fox, at the beginning of his term, according to Reforma newspaper. Peña Nieto's approval rating is even lower than that for presidents Ernesto Zedillo and Felipe Calderón at the disastrous crisis-ridden beginnings of their terms, according to the same source. A recent poll also shows increased public skepticism in Peña Nieto's, "Pact for Mexico," Today, only 21 percent of the population believes that this pact will benefit them while 31 percent are convinced that it will harm them. This same independent poll reveals that the majority of the population perceives the agreement to be in the interests principally of the political parties and big business. Only 35 percent think that the country as a whole will benefit. It is important to remember that Peña Nieto only received 38.2 percent of the vote in the 2012 presidential elections and that the voting base of his party (Party of the Institutional Revolution-PRI) is principally located in the poorest, least educated, and most isolated rural sectors of the population. All of the most "modern" and "middle class" sectors of the population voted overwhelmingly against bringing the PRI and its pretty-boy candidate back to power, according to independent exit polls and demographic surveys. For instance, the only time Peña Nieto dared to hold a campaign event with college students during last year's presidential race, he was aggressively run off the campus amid shouts that he was an "assassin" and a "thief." Peña Nieto's strategy has been to compensate for this weakness in public support by co-opting the old political opposition and turning his back on his critics in society. But this approach has recently come up against a brick wall. For instance, in their haste to demonstrate quick legislative results, the politicians forgot to consult with civil society before pushing through a controversial education reform at lightning speed last December. As a result, today thousands of teachers are on strike throughout Mexico's poorest southern states of Chiapas, Oaxaca, Guerrero, and Michoacán in protest against a reform which they correctly claim threatens to drastically reduce job security, introduce excessive standardized testing, entrench inequality between schools in wealthy and poor areas, and privatize public education. In the state of Guerrero, local citizen militias, parents, and youth groups have even joined with the teachers in a broad-based coalition against Peña Nieto's broader neoliberal economic agenda. Indeed, the Pact for Mexico itself may soon entirely break apart. A new scandal involving the use of Peña Nieto's federal social programs to purchase votes has led the two leading opposition parties, PAN from the right and PRD from the left, to threaten abandoning the pact altogether unless the president takes action against his own top officials. This will be an important test of political will for Peña Nieto to see whether he is able to prioritize accountability over political expediency.

### Union Thumper

#### Teachers union protests hurt political capital

Montes 2013

Juan, “Strikes by Mexican Teachers Challenge New President,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323551004578438882863242710.html

Last week, tens of thousands of teachers, some armed with metal bars and Molotov cocktails, marched in Guerrero's capital, Chilpancingo. They again blocked for hours the highway that connects Mexico City with the Pacific port of Acapulco, hurting a key economic and tourist hub. The demonstrations have been held sporadically since the overhaul bill was signed.

A protracted conflict could undermine Mr. Peña Nieto's political capital as he is seeking wide consensus for his ambitious agenda, which he put into action with the education-revamp bill just after taking office on Dec. 1. It would also raise doubts over whether the education overhaul will be fully implemented, analysts say. Government officials say the protests won't stop the changes from proceeding.

### Link Defense

#### ( ) No link – plan popular in Mexico

Taylor, ’12 – Washington Times correspondant

[Guy Taylor, the Washington Times State Department correspondent, whose work was supported by the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting and the Fund For Investigative Journalism, Charismatic front-runner in Mexican presidential race vows shift on drugs, trade, 4/17/12, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/apr/17/trade-top-priority-for-mexican-front-runner/]

The front-runner in Mexico’s presidential race has attracted throngs of supporters among elite and ordinary citizens alike with his calls to boost his country’s trade relationships with Canada and the U.S. — a refocusing effort his staffers call “NAFTA 2.0” — and to tamp down the drug violence that has muddied Mexico’s reputation. **For** Enrique Pena **Nieto** of the Institutional Revolutionary Party — **and** apparently **the majority of the Mexican electorate** — **the economic ties that bind the U.S. and Mexico “need to grow.”** “If we take into consideration what’s happening in the world and the way that competition among countries today is being built by blocs, I believe **we have a great opportunity to make a very strong bloc in North America**,” he said in an exclusive interview with The Washington Times. “I will work on building infrastructure that can make the whole region of North America more competitive.” His message may sound unusual, if not naive, in a country where the news is dominated by reports about drug gangs, corrupt cops and the deaths of nearly 50,000 people in drug-related violence during recent years. But **he is bent on shifting the narrative** away from the illicit drug trade and **toward a collective realization of the potential** for growth in the legal economic **flow between Mexico and the U.S. — a message that resonates among rank-and-file voters seeking jobs and business owners seeking new markets.** A centrist politician with boyish good looks and charm, Mr. Pena Nieto has built a big lead in the polls ahead of the July 1 election. If he wins, which many here say is inevitable, his plan is to channel that charm toward the United States. “We have an opportunity to go further in our relationship with the United States and Canada, but especially with the United States,” he said.

## China

#### Doesn’t solve either advantage

### 2ac – certainty key

#### Certainty key – prevent loss of production and hit to national security

General Adams, 13 – Brigadier General for the U.S. Army (Retired) (John, “REMAKING AMERICAN SECURITY: SUPPLY CHAIN VULNERABILITIES & NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS ACROSS THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE” http://americanmanufacturing.org/files/RemakingAmericanSecurityMay2013.pdf)djm

Accordingly, this report examined a series of defense industrial base sectors that are vital to U.S. security. Some are especially important and require immediate attention to prevent critical loss of supply or production capacity, constituting an immediate threat to national security. Some sectors are vulnerable to immediate disruption arising from excessive or misaligned foreign dependency, while others face longer-term challenges. In general, the risks posed to many sectors of the defense industrial base may prove very difficult to fix, because they are a part of powerful, prevailing trends in the international technology market and the global economy. All of these challenges demand our best strategic thinking about how to prevent or contain significant and potentially dangerous risks to national security. This report investigates those risks and is a call to action to mitigate them.

### 2ac – mexico key – brazil/india

#### Mexico is key – expertise

Rios et. al. 12 – (Manuel Sandoval Ríos, María Cristina Carreón Sánchez, Juan Héctor Algrávez Gómez, Ronald Eduardo Pérez Díaz, “Mexico’s Aerospace Industry Road Map”, ProMexico, http://www.promexico.gob.mx/work/models/promexico/Resource/1985/1/images/Aerospace\_CHIHUAHUA\_ENG.pdf)//javi

The United States our major commercial partner is going through a talent crisis due to a lack of engineering graduates, added to constant cuts in defense spending, which complicates the upkeep of its current abilities to research, develop and produce defense and high-tech dual-use items. Mexico has more engineering graduates per capita than the United States and skilled and engineering labor costs are more competitive in Mexico; the technological sophistication of its manufactured goods is above that of BRIC countries such as India and Brazil. These three factors make Mexico the best answer to the issues that affect the United States.

## Service Sector

### 2ac – key to navy

#### Mexico is key to the navy – copper nickel tubing

General Adams, 13 – Brigadier General for the U.S. Army (Retired) (John, “REMAKING AMERICAN SECURITY: SUPPLY CHAIN VULNERABILITIES & NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS ACROSS THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE” http://americanmanufacturing.org/files/RemakingAmericanSecurityMay2013.pdf)

In addition to these domestic companies, the European conglomerate KME and several companies in Mexico also produce Cu-Ni tubing for the U.S. Navy. However, other than Ansonia Brass & Copper, KME is the only company capable of producing this larger diameter tubing according to U.S. military specifications. As a result, the U.S. domestic production capability of Cu-Ni tubing is at risk, potentially leaving the U.S. Navy solely dependent on foreign manufacturers for this important supply chain.

### 1nc – warming defense

#### Warming won’t cause extinction

Barrett 07, professor of natural resource economics – Columbia University

(Scott, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods, introduction)

First, climate change does not threaten the survival of the human species.5 If unchecked, it will cause other species to become extinction (though biodiversity is being depleted now due to other reasons). It will alter critical ecosystems (though this is also happening now, and for reasons unrelated to climate change). It will reduce land area as the seas rise, and in the process displace human populations. “Catastrophic” climate change is possible, but not certain. Moreover, and unlike an asteroid collision, large changes (such as sea level rise of, say, ten meters) will likely take centuries to unfold, giving societies time to adjust. “Abrupt” climate change is also possible, and will occur more rapidly, perhaps over a decade or two. However, abrupt climate change (such as a weakening in the North Atlantic circulation), though potentially very serious, is unlikely to be ruinous. Human-induced climate change is an experiment of planetary proportions, and we cannot be sur of its consequences. Even in a worse case scenario, however, global climate change is not the equivalent of the Earth being hit by mega-asteroid. Indeed, if it were as damaging as this, and if we were sure that it would be this harmful, then our incentive to address this threat would be overwhelming. The challenge would still be more difficult than asteroid defense, but we would have done much more about it by now.

#### CO2 isn’t key

Watts 12, 25-year climate reporter, works with weather technology, weather stations, and weather data processing systems in the private sector, 7/25/’12

(Anthony, <http://wattsupwiththat.com/2012/07/25/lindzen-at-sandia-national-labs-climate-models-are-flawed/>)

ALBUQUERQUE, N.M. — Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Richard Lindzen, a global warming skeptic, told about 70 Sandia researchers in June that too much is being made of climate change by researchers seeking government funding. He said their data and their methods did not support their claims. “Despite concerns over the last decades with the greenhouse process, they oversimplify the effect,” he said. “Simply cranking up CO2 [carbon dioxide] (as the culprit) is not the answer” to what causes climate change. Lindzen, the ninth speaker in Sandia’s Climate Change and National Security Speaker Series, is Alfred P. Sloan professor of meteorology in MIT’s department of earth, atmospheric and planetary sciences. He has published more than 200 scientific papers and is the lead author of Chapter 7 (“Physical Climate Processes and Feedbacks”) of the International Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Third Assessment Report. He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences and a fellow of the American Geophysical Union and the American Meteorological Society. For 30 years, climate scientists have been “locked into a simple-minded identification of climate with greenhouse-gas level. … That climate should be the function of a single parameter (like CO2) has always seemed implausible. Yet an obsessive focus on such an obvious oversimplification has likely set back progress by decades,” Lindzen said. For major climates of the past, other factors were more important than carbon dioxide. Orbital variations have been shown to quantitatively account for the cycles of glaciations of the past 700,000 years, he said, and the elimination of the arctic inversion, when the polar caps were ice-free, “is likely to have been more important than CO2 for the warm episode during the Eocene 50 million years ago.” There is little evidence that changes in climate are producing extreme weather events, he said. “Even the IPCC says there is little if any evidence of this. In fact, there are important physical reasons for doubting such anticipations.” Lindzen’s views run counter to those of almost all major professional societies. For example, the American Physical Society statement of Nov. 18, 2007, read, “The evidence is incontrovertible: Global warming is occurring.” But he doesn’t feel they are necessarily right. “Why did the American Physical Society take a position?” he asked his audience. “Why did they find it compelling? They never answered.” Speaking methodically with flashes of humor — “I always feel that when the conversation turns to weather, people are bored.” — he said a basic problem with current computer climate models that show disastrous increases in temperature is that relatively small increases in atmospheric gases lead to large changes in temperatures in the models. But, he said, “predictions based on high (climate) sensitivity ran well ahead of observations.” Real-world observations do not support IPCC models, he said: “We’ve already seen almost the equivalent of a doubling of CO2 (in radiative forcing) and that has produced very little warming.”He disparaged proving the worth of models by applying their criteria to the prediction of past climatic events, saying, “The models are no more valuable than answering a test when you have the questions in advance.” Modelers, he said, merely have used aerosols as a kind of fudge factor to make their models come out right. (Aerosols are tiny particles that reflect sunlight. They are put in the air by industrial or volcanic processes and are considered a possible cause of temperature change at Earth’s surface.) Then there is the practical question of what can be done about temperature increases even if they are occurring, he said. “China, India, Korea are not going to go along with IPCC recommendations, so … the only countries punished will be those who go along with the recommendations.” He discounted mainstream opinion that climate change could hurt national security, saying that “historically there is little evidence of natural disasters leading to war, but economic conditions have proven much more serious. Almost all proposed mitigation policies lead to reduced energy availability and higher energy costs. All studies of human benefit and national security perspectives show that increased energy is important.” He showed a graph that demonstrated that more energy consumption leads to higher literacy rate, lower infant mortality and a lower number of children per woman. Given that proposed policies are unlikely to significantly influence climate and that lower energy availability could be considered a significant threat to national security, to continue with a mitigation policy that reduces available energy “would, at the least, appear to be irresponsible,” he argued. Responding to audience questions about rising temperatures, he said a 0.8 of a degree C change in temperature in 150 years is a small change. Questioned about five-, seven-, and 17-year averages that seem to show that Earth’s surface temperature is rising, he said temperatures are always fluctuating by tenths of a degree.